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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
  n June 24, 2014, a month after ISIS1 leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi de-
clared the formation of an Islamic Caliphate stretching from northern Syria 
                                                                                                                      
 Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of Exeter; Associate Fellow, Chatham 
House. All views are expressed in a personal capacity. 
 Senior Protection Associate, UNHCR, London. All views are expressed in a per-
sonal capacity and do not reflect the views of UNHCR or the United Nations.  
The authors thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and are especially grate-
ful for the support of and work done by the editorial team on this paper. The thoughts 
and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. govern-
ment, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College. 
1. Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). The group is otherwise referred to as 
“Daesh” or “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL). 
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into Iraq, ISIS militants, who had taken control of the city of Mosul in Iraq, 
methodically laid explosives in and around the famed shrine and mosque of 
the Prophet Younis and blew up the ancient site. The destruction, which 
reduced the shrine and Iraq’s oldest mosque to a mound of rubble, was cap-
tured on video and subsequently posted online. The shrine was built on an 
archeological site dating back to the eighth century BC and was renovated in 
the 1990s under Saddam Hussein. It was a popular destination for Muslim 
and Christian pilgrims from around the world.2 Although it was not the first 
time that ISIS had targeted religious and cultural property, the destruction 
of the shrine marked the beginning of a theatrical campaign by the militants 
to systematically annihilate such property in the territories under their con-
trol.3 The ensuing assaults on religious and cultural property—more visible 
in Iraq but which nevertheless also extended to Syria—sparked widespread 
condemnation and were described by UNESCO’s Director-General as “cul-
tural cleansing” and as constituting war crimes.4 The release by ISIS of 
graphic images displaying the deliberate destruction of religious and cultural 
sites, buildings, monuments and ancient artefacts, may have placed the pro-
tection of cultural property center-stage. However, it has not gone unno-
ticed that, in the course of the recent wars that have blighted both countries, 
States and other non-State actors have likewise consistently failed, albeit in 
different ways and degrees, to fully respect cultural property as they are le-
gally required to do.  
The ambition to protect cultural property in war dates back to the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, when States first began to codify rules to 
                                                                                                                      
2. ISIS Militants Blow up Jonah’s Tomb, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2014), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2014/jul/24/isis-militants-blow-up-jonah-tomb. 
3. In January 2014, ISIS militants were already destroying Syrian cultural property in 
territories they controlled. Patrick Cockburn, The Destruction of the Idols: Syria’s Patrimony at 
Risk from Extremists, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.independent. 
co.uk/news/science/archaeology/news/the-destruction-of-the-idols-syrias-patrimony-at-
risk-from-extremists-9122275.html. 
4. UNESCO, Heritage and Cultural Diversity at Risk in Iraq and Syria, 3–4 (Dec. 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter UNESCO, Heritage], http://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/iraq-syria/Iraq 
SyriaReport-en.pdf (“The term cultural cleansing refers to an intentional strategy that 
seeks to destroy cultural diversity through the deliberate targeting of individuals identified 
on the basis of their cultural, ethnic or religious background, combined with deliberate 
attacks on their places of worship, memory and learning. The strategy of cultural cleansing 
that can be witnessed in Iraq and Syria is reflected in attacks against cultural heritage, that 
is both against physical, tangible and built expressions of culture such as monuments and 
buildings, as well as against minorities and intangible expressions of culture such as cus-
toms, traditions and beliefs.”). 
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limit the detrimental effects of warfare.5 Often, however, the law has not 
kept pace with societal expectations or the changing nature of warfare.6 In 
particular, the large scale destruction and misappropriation of cultural 
property during the Second World War exposed the need for a more ro-
bust protection regime and, in 1954, this lacuna was filled with the adop-
tion of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict (Cultural Property Convention).7 In 1977, the 
protection of cultural property was given a further boost with the adoption 
of the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, codifying the 
                                                                                                                      
5. See, e.g., U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of 
the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, arts. 35 & 36, Apr. 24, 1863, re-
printed in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiří Toman eds., 4th 
ed. 2004) [hereinafter Lieber Code]; Project of an International Declaration concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, art. VIII, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in id. at 23; Institute 
of International Law, Oxford Manual of the Laws of War on Land (1880), reprinted in id. 
at 29; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 23(g), 25, 27 & 
56, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Treaty on 
the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments [Roerich 
Pact] (Inter-American), Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289, 33 MARTENS 
NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser.4) 650.  
6. Some experts have suggested that the changing character of warfare has heightened 
the risk of destruction of and damage to cultural property. See, for example, a report re-
leased in February 2002 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stating  
 
the growing number of interreligious and interethnic conflicts has implied not only attacks 
against civilians but also, in many cases, the destruction of civilian objects, in particular 
cultural property. Acts of vandalism directed against such objects or their destruction are 
particularly common in such conflicts, as cultural property can be considered to symbolize 
the cultural identity and history of the adverse party.  
  
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPER-
TY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT, REPORT ON THE MEETING OF EXPERTS, OCT. 
5–6, 2000, at 9 (2002) (Introduction). A similar sentiment was also expressed by 
UNESCO’s Director-General following the attacks by ISIS on Mosul Museum in Febru-
ary 2015 when she stated, “this tragedy is far from just a cultural issue: it’s an issue of ma-
jor security. We see clearly how terrorists use the destruction of heritage in their strategy 
to destabilize and manipulate populations so that they can assure their own domination.” 
UNESCO Calls for Mobilization to Stop “Cultural Cleansing” in Iraq, UNESCO (Feb. 27, 
2015), http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1242/. 
7. KEVIN CHAMBERLAIN, WAR AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT 
OF AN ARMED CONFLICT 22–23 (2005). Convention for the Protection of Cultural Prop-
erty in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S 240 [hereinafter 1954 
Cultural Property Convention]. 
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rules on the conduct of hostilities.8 However, much of this progress was 
confined to affording greater protection to cultural property in internation-
al armed conflict (IAC) or, in other words, inter-State conflict. In contrast, 
the protection of cultural property in non-international armed conflict 
(those waged between the armed forces of the State and organized armed 
groups or between such groups, or NIAC) lagged due to the reluctance on 
the part of States to allow for any international regulation of internal vio-
lence. The perception that international regulation would constitute a viola-
tion of State sovereignty and an interference in internal matters has meant 
that even when treaties have been extended to NIAC, as in the case of the 
Cultural Property Convention, the process has been carried out through a 
poorly drafted provision that has subsequently given rise to different inter-
pretations and legal ambiguity.9 Further compounding this difficulty is the 
fact that often inadequate attention is paid to how the substantive provi-
sions set forth in a treaty designed primarily for IAC apply in NIAC, in 
light of the fundamental differences between the two types of armed con-
flict.10 This has certainly been the experience with the Cultural Property 
Convention. Criticisms aside, the Convention must nevertheless be ap-
                                                                                                                      
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, 
art. 19, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].  
9. Structurally, the 1954 Cultural Property Convention parallels the precedent estab-
lished by Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and extends, as a minimum, 
rules on “respect” (as set forth in Article 4) for cultural property in non-international 
armed conflict. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 4. However, the 
wording of Article 19 of the Cultural Property Convention (on the material scope of the 
obligations) is unclear and consequently legal experts disagree as to which obligations ap-
ply in NIAC. Id. art. 19. For further commentary, see SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW 
OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 377 (2012). A similar criticism of the 1999 
Second Protocol to the 1954 Cultural Property Convention has been made by other ex-
perts. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, The Protection of Cultural Property in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 81, 83–85 (Nout 
van Woudenberg & Liesbeth Lijnzaad eds., 2010). Second Protocol to the Hague Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 
1999, 2253 U.N.T.S 212 [hereinafter Second Protocol]. 
10. As Jan Hladik, commenting on the failure of the Cultural Property Convention 
“to deliver on its promise,” notes, “it is even more difficult to apply in a conflict not of an 
international character.” Jan Hladik, The Review Process of the 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Impact on International Humani-
tarian Law, 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 313, 314 (1998). 
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plauded on the basis that it is the first treaty which extends the application 
of conduct of hostility rules to NIAC.11  
Over the following four decades, little headway was made in furthering 
the protection of cultural property in NIAC, despite the adoption of Addi-
tional Protocol II in 1977.12 This hiatus in the progress of legal protection 
was reversed in the aftermath of the Balkan wars of the early 1990s. While 
it was the scale of the human suffering which unfolded at Europe’s back-
door that was the catalyst for the “revival” of international criminal law and 
a change in global attitude towards the international regulation of NIAC, 
the targeting of cultural property by all parties to the conflicts gave addi-
tional momentum for change. The systematic destruction of cultural herit-
age, exemplified by the attacks on the bridge at Mostar and the bombing of 
Dubrovnik’s old city center (a recognized World Heritage site), prompted 
States to take further steps in the protection of cultural property. The ini-
tiatives culminated in the adoption in 1999 of the Second Protocol to the 
1954 Cultural Property Convention which applies in its entirety to both 
IAC and NIAC.13 Thus, over the last two decades there have been signifi-
cant advances in the evolution of the normative regime—treaty and cus-
tomary international law—to protect cultural property in NIAC. As cultur-
al property has once again come under attack it is pertinent to ask what 
rules apply to the parties in the existing conflicts in Syria and Iraq.  
This paper is divided into four sections. In Section II we confront the 
“extra-legal” question as to why cultural property merits legal protection, 
not least in war. Addressing this question seems necessary because to con-
cern ourselves with the protection of cultural property against the back-
drop of the shocking level of carnage, loss of life and suffering endured by 
the people of Iraq and Syria begs the question as to whether our moral out-
rage and concerns over property destruction and damage are misplaced. 
The armed conflicts that have plagued both countries in recent years have 
exacted a heavy human toll. Combined, as many as three-quarters of a mil-
lion have died as a direct and indirect consequence of the conflicts, while 
fifteen million have been displaced.14 On any measure these are shocking 
                                                                                                                      
11. Henckaerts, supra note 9, at 87–88. 
12. For comment on the legal effect of Additional Protocol II, see id. 
13. Jiří Toman, The Road to the 1999 Second Protocol in PROTECTING CULTURAL PROP-
ERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 9, at 1, 10.  
14. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the conflict in Syria 
has displaced over eleven million people (7.6 million are internally displaced) whilst in Iraq 
over four million people have been internally displaced. Internal Displacement Monitoring 
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figures that demand far more proactive efforts on the part of the global 
community to provide meaningful protection.15 But to care about protect-
ing civilians from the effects of war should not deprive us from wanting to 
concurrently protect civilian property more generally and cultural property 
in particular. We therefore start from the simple premise that these are not 
mutually exclusive goals. As such, we do not explore the philosophical and 
moral questions that are engendered by the notion of hierarchies in the 
idea of protection.16 However, what we do engage with is the equally vex-
ing set of questions pertaining to the interests that the law seeks to uphold 
through the protection of cultural property. In Section III we trace the de-
struction and damage to cultural property that has been documented in 
both Syria and Iraq over recent years. We do so not only to draw attention 
to the extent of the destruction but also to identify the different ways in 
which such property has been harmed to better account for any gaps in the 
existing law. In Section IV we critically examine the legal landscape pertain-
ing to the protection of cultural property in NIAC and what consequences 
follow in the event of a breach of a prohibition. In Section V we offer 
some concluding comments.   
 
II. WHY WE PROTECT CULTURAL PROPERTY 
 
The reaction of the global community to the recent spate of incidents in-
volving the destruction of cultural property in non-international armed 
conflict (from Syria to Iraq, Mali17 and Yemen18) demonstrates the extent to 
which the protection of cultural property is now regarded as a matter of 
                                                                                                                      
Centre, Middle East and North Africa, http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-
and-north-africa/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
15. This should not be interpreted as a call for the use of force on humanitarian 
grounds. It is neither lawful nor, in the opinion of the authors, an option that will serve 
the needs of those who require protection.  
16. The law generally confronts the question of these hierarchies through terms such 
as “reasonable” and “feasible.” Since the law of war embraces both utilitarian and deonto-
logical approaches, there are never absolute answers. 
17. Damage to Timbuktu’s Cultural Heritage Worse than First Estimated Reports UNESCO 
Mission, UNESCO (June 7, 2013), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single 
-view/newhttp://www.unesco.org/culture/pdf/iraq-syria/IraqSyriaReport-en.pdfs/da 
mage_to_timbuktus_cultural_heritage_worse_than_first_estimated_reports_unesco_missi
on /#.Vd13tMuFPIU. 
18. Rick Gladstone, Explosion Destroys Ancient Cultural Heritage Site in Yemen Capital, 
NEW YORK TIMES (June 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/mid 
dleeast/yemen-sana-explosion-houthis-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0. 
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international concern and subject to international norms. That said, one of 
the most curious aspects of the international law on the protection of cul-
tural property is that there is no consensus as to what constitutes such 
property. The definition of cultural property varies between international 
instruments and consequently what falls within the scope of protection un-
der any single treaty will not necessarily do so under another.19 Take, for 
example, those treaties applicable in armed conflict. Under the Cultural 
Property Convention, protection is limited to “movable or immovable 
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people,”20 
while the 1907 Hague Regulations extend protection, without condition, to 
“buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes [and] 
historic monuments.”21 A further layer of complexity and definitional inde-
                                                                                                                      
19. See, e.g., Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention], which defines cultural property as 
“property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as 
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science.” The 
definition in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or 
Illegally exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, is described as more 
“elastic” in that cultural objects are “those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of 
importance for archaeology, prehistory, literature, art or science.” See also JIŘÍ TOMAN, 
THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 40–41 
(1996). 
20. The 1954 Cultural Property Convention defines cultural property as: 
   
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; ar-
chaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic inter-
est; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeolog-
ical interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives 
or of reproductions of the property defined above; 
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable 
cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and deposi-
tories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the 
movable cultural property defined in subparagraph (a);  
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in subparagraphs 
(a) and (b), to be known as ‘centers containing monuments.’ 
’. 
1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(a). 
21. Hague Regulations, supra note 5, art. 27. Yet another definition is introduced in 
AP II, supra note 8, art. 16, which refers to “historic monuments, works of art or places of 
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples,” although experts 
have emphasized that despite the difference in terminology between the 1954 Cultural 
Property Convention and AP II, “the basic idea is the same.” COMMENTARY ON THE AD-
DITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949 ¶ 2064 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) 
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terminacy is presented by customary international law definitions that do 
not correspond to treaty definitions.22 Adding to the indeterminacy of what 
constitutes cultural property is the fact that the decision as to what proper-
ty merits protection because it is labeled “cultural property” is a matter left 
for individual States to determine.  
The literature on cultural property is equally multi-textured and, for the 
most part, the discourse is dominated by an overriding ambiguity that oscil-
lates between over- and under-inclusive ideas as to what comprises cultural 
property. Legal experts continue to struggle to define the term, if only to 
pinpoint precisely what is implicated, but even when approached disjunc-
tively, both the concept of “property” and of “culture” elude categorical or 
normative definition.23 The most we can conclude is that cultural property 
is more than just “property”—moveable or immovable, tangible or intan-
gible—but an ever-shifting dynamic idea that alters with time and location. 
That no real consensus exists as to what constitutes cultural property is un-
surprising since, by definition, the very term defies definition.24  
If clarity and precision are essential to the question of protection, we 
are further thwarted by the constant slippage in the lexicon, intended and 
otherwise. As the law maneuvers between cultural “property,” cultural 
                                                                                                                      
[hereinafter 1977 AP COMMENTARY]. See also Roger O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 425, 430, ¶¶ 4–8 (Dieter 
Fleck ed., 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter O’Keefe, Protection]. 
22. That said, in the context of the law of armed conflict and for the purposes of in-
ternational criminal law, the accepted customary international law definition is that which 
is set forth in the 1907 Hague Regulations. 
23. Claudia Caruthers, International Cultural Property: Another Tragedy of the Commons, 7(1) 
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 143, 147 (1998). As Caruthers observes, “the mor-
phology of traditional Western property theory reflects very abstract notions of property. 
Thus we find Lockean labor concepts, intellectual property notions regarding the creation 
of value, prime possessor norms and utilitarian concepts all competing, among others, for 
hegemony. Property eludes categorical or normative definition.” Critical scholars have also 
exposed how prevailing conceptions of temporality which are essentially chronological 
and linear rather than “ethical-centripetal” have shaped the definitions of what constitute 
cultural property in international legal instruments. Reinhard Bernbeck, Heritage Politics: 
Learning from Mullah Omar?, in CONTROLLING THE PAST, OWNING THE FUTURE: THE PO-
LITICAL USES OF ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 27–54 (Ran Boytner, Lynn Swartz 
Dodd & Bradley J. Parker, eds., 2010). For a useful insight, see Tatiana Flessas, Cultural 
Property Defined, and Redefined as Nietzschean Aphorism, 24 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1067 
(2003). 
24. See generally Eric Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical 
Observations (University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 
No. 141, 2006), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/. 
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“patrimony” and cultural “heritage,”25 between property of “great im-
portance” to property that is of “universal” value, and from property that is 
of value to “peoples,” to “mankind,” to “States,” we are left no wiser. 
These ambiguities and tensions are embedded and reproduced in the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC) exemplified by the 1954 Cultural Property Conven-
tion. While the Preamble embraces an internationalist calling in announcing 
that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever 
means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes 
its contribution to the culture of the world,”26 the treaty text sets forth a 
definition of cultural property that necessarily defers to the judgment of 
States.27 The law leads us full circle, back to the same questions: What qual-
ifies for protection? Who decides what is “ordinary” versus of “great im-
portance” and on what basis?28 These questions entail subjective judgments 
based on arbitrary criteria.  
We suggest that the elusiveness of what comprises cultural property 
rests with the fact that law is attempting to protect a multiplicity of inter-
ests and values represented by “cultural property” that are constantly in 
flux. Definitions will always be under- or over-inclusive because the value 
that is projected onto the form of the property—whether it is aesthetic, 
symbolic, institutional, instrumental, monetary, knowledge or a combina-
tion thereof—is perpetually being constituted, contested and re-
                                                                                                                      
25. Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 61 (2000). See also Manlio Frigo, Cultural Property v Cultural Heritage: 
A “Battle of Concepts” in International Law? 86 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 
367 (2004); Craig Forrest, Cultural Heritage as the Common Heritage of Humankind: A Critical 
Re-evaluation, 40 THE COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 124 (2007). 
26. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, pmbl. (emphasis added).  
27. In the words of O’Keefe, “what all this means in practice is that Article 1 de-
volves to each party the discretionary competence to determine the precise property in its 
territory to which the Convention applies.” ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CUL-
TURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 105 (2006).  
28. But, as O’Keefe points out, “things are not so straightforward.” O’Keefe, Protec-
tion, supra note 21, at 433, ¶ 9. If a State fails to identify what property it considers to be 
“of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people,” judgment necessarily falls to 
others to decide. However, to suggest—as is done in the OFFICE OF THE GENERAL 
COUNSEL, US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 5.18.1.2 (2015) [here-
inafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]—that “ordinary property (such as churches or 
works of art) that are not of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people 
would not qualify as cultural property” is potentially problematic and the better approach 
is to err on the side of caution. 
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constituted. What elevates some civilian property to merit “special” protec-
tion is simply the additional value, whatever that might be, that has been 
projected onto the property.29 Thus, in thinking about why we protect cul-
tural property, the more useful avenue of interrogation may be to ask what 
values are being upheld by the law through the protection of such property.  
Calls to accord cultural property special protection have often been 
founded on the perceived aesthetic value of the property. One of the earli-
est proponents of this view is Emer de Vattel who reasoned: 
 
[F]or whatever cause a country be devastated, these buildings should be 
spared which are an honour to the human race and which do not add to 
the strength of the enemy, such as temples, tombs, public buildings and 
all edifices of remarkable beauty. What is gained by destroying them? It is 
the act of a declared enemy of the human race thus wantonly to deprive 
men of these monuments of arts and models of architecture . . .30 
 
It was along the same vein that in 1944 Sir Harold Nicholson penned his 
now well-cited pleading for special protection of works of “major artistic 
value.”31 The sentiment expressed is not dissimilar to that more recently 
voiced by Stanislaw E. Nahilik: 
  
The human individual is mortal and generations follow one upon the oth-
er. It is nevertheless possible for every generation, however fleeting its ex-
istence, to leave here below an immortal trace of its genius, embodied in a 
                                                                                                                      
29. The law of armed conflict confronts the problem of contingency by extending 
protection, at a minimum, to all such property by virtue of it being civilian. 
30. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL 
LAW, book III, ch. IX, ¶ 168, (Carnegie Institution of Washington 1916) (1758). 
31. Sir Nicolson argued,  
 
it is to my mind absolutely desirable that works [of major artistic value] should be pre-
served from destruction, even if their preservation entails the sacrifice of human lives. I 
should assuredly be prepared to be shot against a wall if I were certain that by such a sac-
rifice I could preserve the Giotto frescoes; nor should I hesitate for an instant (were such 
a decision ever open to me) to save St. Mark’s even if I were aware that by so doing I 
should bring death to my sons. I should know that in a hundred years from now it would 
matter not at all if I or my children had survived: whereas it would matter seriously and 
permanently if the Piazza at Venice had been reduced to dust and ashes either by the 
Americans or ourselves. My attitude would be governed by a principle which is surely in-
controvertible. The irreplaceable is more important than the replaceable, and the loss of 
even the most valued human life is ultimately less disastrous than the loss of something 
which in no circumstances can ever be created again. 
 
Sir Harold Nicolson, Marginal Comment, Bombing Works of Art, THE SPECTATOR (Feb. 25, 
1944). 
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work of art here, an historical monument there or cultural property in an-
other case. We should never forget the relationship between what is fleet-
ing and what, alone, can endow people and their works with perennial 
qualities. Vita brevis—Ars longa . . . 32 
 
Two comments are merited. First, the idea that an object by virtue of its 
aesthetic value alone merits protection in war is a view that can be traced to 
the end of Renaissance and the emergence of a European “elite” with cos-
mopolitan tastes and interest in fine arts, architecture and antiquities.33 Pri-
or to this period, and certainly well into the seventeenth century, there is 
little evidence to indicate that such objects merited any kind of protection, 
least of all in war.34 The destruction of property was accepted as an inevita-
ble aspect of warfare and, if enemy property was spared, it was, more likely 
than not, on the basis that the spoils of war belonged to the victor.35 Sec-
                                                                                                                      
32. Stanislaw E. Nahilik, La Protection Internationale des Biens Culturels en Cas de Conflit 
Arm, 120 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 159 (1967), 
translated in Toman, supra note 13, at 19. 
33. The emergence of a ruling class who began to take an interest in classical antiquity 
can be traced to the Renaissance. This trend took on greater momentum throughout the 
Enlightenment and, with the advent of disciplines including archeology, history and art, 
the idea of collating material not only for those ends, but also to study and order, was em-
braced and exemplified by the arrival of the museum and the gallery. This period of Euro-
pean colonization also witnessed the discovery of major archaeological sites including, for 
example, Pompeii. 
34. As Sax notes, “for most of history, neglect or iconoclasm were far more common 
than protection,” Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and 
the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1142, 1143 (1990). PATRICK J. BOYLAN, 
UNESCO REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPER-
TY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT, ch. 2, sec. 4 (1993) [hereinafter BOYLAN RE-
PORT] (concluding that “the destruction, defacing or conversion to a deliberately inappro-
priate use of monuments of special cultural value to the identity and spiritual values of a 
conquered people—such as religious buildings and national historic sites—has been wide-
ly used throughout history as a sing of conquest and subjugation.”). 
35. The Greek historian Xenophon noted, “it is a universal and eternal law that, in a 
city captured by enemies in a state of war, everything, both persons and goods, shall be-
long to the conquerors.” XENOPHON, CYROPAEDIA book 7, ch. 7, § 73, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0204%3A
book%3D7%3Achapter%3D5%3Asection%3D73. Some scholars have suggested that 
sacred objects were spared by the Romans out of respect, but there is little evidence to 
show that such practices represented the norm. See generally Margaret Miles, Burnt Temples in 
the Landscape of the Past in Valuing the Past, in THE GRECO-ROMAN WORLD: PROCEEDINGS 
FROM THE PENN-LEIDEN COLLOQUIA ON ANCIENT VALUES VII 111–45 (Christopher 
Pieper & Janes Ker eds., 2014); MARGARET MILES, ART AS PLUNDER: ORIGINS OF DE-
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ond, those who invoke the aesthetic value of an object as the basis for pro-
tection generally cite a supplementary value in support of their claim;36 this 
is to be expected given the problematization of aestheticism.   
In a great majority of cases, the special protection that is accorded to 
cultural property derives from its symbolic value. This is because such 
property is often an expression or representation of a shared social identi-
ty.37 As UNESCO’s Director-General noted, “culture and heritage are not 
about stones and buildings—they are about identities and belongings. They 
carry values from the past that are important for the societies today and 
tomorrow. . . . We must safeguard the heritage because it is what brings us 
together as a community; it is what binds us within a shared destiny.”38 The 
                                                                                                                      
BATE ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY (2008). Although a number of theologians in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries voiced the opinion that some objects (for their artistic, 
historic or religious value) might be spared because destruction served no military ad-
vantage, it was widely accepted that such destruction was permissible. See, in particular, 
HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE book 3, ch. 5 (1625), http:// 
lonang.com/library/reference/grotius-law-war-and-peace/gro-305/. Revolution and Na-
poleonic Wars marked a significant turning point in the protection of cultural property in 
war, but the change in attitude was very much founded on the simple proposition that 
such property belonged to the State rather than on any idea that cultural property per se 
merited special protection. Moreover, it was during this period that the idea of limited 
warfare began to take root and it was based on this notion that the British Foreign Secre-
tary Lord Castlereagh described the systematic appropriation of the vast collection of art-
works by Napoleon as plunder, “in contravention of the laws of modern war.” O’KEEFE, 
supra note 27, at 16 (quoting Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Plenipotentiaries of 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia (Sept. 1815), in BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1815–
1816, at 203, 206 (1838)). 
36. For example, Nahilik’s reasoning is based not solely on the aesthetic value of the 
property but also on the possibility that “man” might defy his own mortality through the 
creation of an object that has the potential to exist in perpetuity. Nahilik, supra note 32. 
37. As was acknowledged in the BOYLAN REPORT, supra note 34, ch. 13.13, “the very 
concept of culture is far from absolute but is very much a product of the culture and val-
ues of those making the various self-definitions.” It is well-established that cultural prop-
erty is not only constituted by, but also functions to constitute identities. States have been 
particularly resourceful in instrumentalizing cultural property to define identities for politi-
cal ends. The power of cultural property to serve both as a unifying and divisive force was 
fully appreciated, paradoxically, by the now-extant Baath Party which, from its rise in 
1968, pursued policies designed to engender a collective identity around the secular State. 
See Benjamin Isakhan, Targeting the Symbolic Dimension of Baathist Iraq: Cultural Destruction, 
Historical Memory, and National Identity, 4 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL OF CULTURE AND COM-
MUNICATION 257–81 (2011).  
38. Irina Bokova, Address at the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS) Gala to commemorate the 40th Anniversary of the World Heritage Conven-
tion (Dec. 2, 2012). 
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paradox is that the very value that makes such property merit special pro-
tection is often the basis upon which the property is specifically targeted in 
war. Attacking cultural property because it is affiliated with the identity of 
the adversary remains a far too frequent feature of war, including the cur-
rent conflicts in Syria and Iraq.39 The symbolic value of cultural property as 
a testament to human plurality, to human diversity and of the possibility of 
coexistence among different groups is also deeply entrenched in contem-
porary concerns over protecting cultural property. Objects and physical 
remains of the past, which were once collected simply out of curiosity for 
the past,40 have acquired an additional symbolic dimension as the tangible 
manifestations of pluralism and of human diversity, which are regarded 
today as good ends in their own right. This is what was intimated by the 
UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy when, bemoaning the destruction in 
Aleppo, he described it as “a particularly valuable city in terms of cultural 
heritage and diversity, where all religions co-exist, where all cultures of the 
Mediterranean have left their mark.”41    
In addition to its symbolic and aesthetic value, the intrinsic value of 
cultural property as a vessel of knowledge is widely acknowledged. As a 
source of knowledge, cultural property provides a richer insight into human 
existence across time and space. Importantly, because such knowledge is 
not only intrinsic to the form, but also derives from the context within 
which that object originates, the severing of the object from its context 
fundamentally deprives the object of its full knowledge value, demonstrat-
ed by the protection accorded to archeological sites rather than solely to 
the objects contained therein. The legal protection of such sites reinforces 
the value that contemporary society places on knowledge acquisition—
known and yet to be discovered—as a common aspiration.  
The law’s concern with protecting cultural property is based not on a 
single defining value but on a collection of values that are projected onto 
                                                                                                                      
39. UNESCO, Background Note to the International Conference “Heritage and Cul-
tural Diversity at Risk in Iraq and Syria,” The Protection of Heritage and Cultural Diversity: A 
Humanitarian and Security Imperative in the Conflicts of the 21st Century 3 (Dec. 3, 2014), http:/ 
/en.unesco.org/system/files/iraqsyriaeventbackgroundnoteeng.pdf (“Attacks against her-
itage and cultural diversity have become a recurrent phenomenon in a number of recent 
armed conflicts. Such attacks, combined with the persecution of minorities, as witnessed 
both in Iraq and Syria, represent a form of cultural cleansing that seeks to destroy the le-
gitimacy of the “other” to exist as such.”). 
40. BRUCE TRIGGER, A HISTORY OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL THOUGHT 27 (2d ed. 2006).  
41. UNESCO, Heritage, supra note 4, at 7 (statement by Mr. Staffan de Mistura, UN 
Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Syria). 
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and embedded in the form of the property. Thus with every property that 
is damaged and destroyed in the current conflicts, what is lost is far more 
than the object itself. The cultural wealth of both Syria and Iraq are well-
documented but it is worth recalling what is at stake.42 The territories 
which comprise modern-day Iraq and northeast Syria correspond to a geo-
graphical area which, over six thousand years ago, formed Mesopotamia, 
“the cradle of civilization,” and it was only in the last century that foreign 
and local archeologists working in both countries begun to uncover the 
histories of Mesopotamia’s civilizations.43 These excavations soon revealed 
a fertile landscape that was once dominated by the Sumerians, Babylonians 
and Assyrians.44 Each civilization left behind traces—some now visible and 
a great deal still hidden—of their extraordinarily sophisticated societies. 
Across Iraq and Syria, the landscape is littered with ancient sites and struc-
tures, some dating back to this early period and still others to later periods 
evidenced by the influence of Hellenistic and Roman architecture. Ancient 
cities such as Aleppo and Damascus, which lay at the crossroads of major 
trade routes linking East with West, brim with tangible traces of past civili-
zations dating back to the second and third centuries respectively. Across 
both Syria and Iraq, the plurality of human histories is chronicled in the 
archeological sites, the museums and in the towns and cities, some of 
which are now inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List and Tentative 
List. Over the centuries the wars fought on this territory would have result-
ed in the loss of a considerable inventory of human creativity and, with 
every war fought, less of the past—whether as knowledge or as a testament 
to human diversity—remains to be handed down to future generations. 
                                                                                                                      
42. In 2011 only sixteen foreign teams and twenty-five national teams out of the pre-
conflict 138 archaeological missions in Syria were still operating. 
43. What archeologists began to discover forced many to fundamentally reappraise 
their views given the unexpectedly sophisticated level of development that had been at-
tained by these civilizations. The excavations revealed, among other things, evidence of 
when man first tamed nature through complex irrigation systems to facilitate agricultural 
development; of the domestication of animals; of the first cities to have been built; and of 
the establishment of trade routes. Over the years further discoveries were made and evi-
dence emerged of the oldest form of writing; of the “birth” of mathematics and with it the 
idea of measuring time; of the concept of legal obligations and rights; and that art, archi-
tecture and culture had thrived.  
44. Little was known of the Babylonians, Assyrians and Sumerians until archaeologists 
began to excavate in the early twentieth century. Unlike the Egyptians, the peoples of 
Mesopotamia had built using mud bricks and, over the centuries, rain, flooding and shift-
ing sand levels had levelled the bricks and buried towers and palaces, leaving shapeless 
mounds.  
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The damaging effect of recent conflicts on the cultural heritage of Syria and 
Iraq is impossible to quantify. From the Iran-Iraq war, to the Gulf wars 
and the current conflicts originating in the 2010 Arab revolutions, the cul-
tural heritage of both Syria and Iraq has been destroyed and damaged as a 
direct and indirect consequence of war.    
 
III. THE OUTBREAK OF THE CURRENT ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE 
FATE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
 
During the early months of the armed conflict in Syria international atten-
tion was focused almost exclusively on the human dimension of the trage-
dy. But as the war spread and continued unabated, attention began to shift 
to other aspects of the conflict, including the extent to which Syria’s cultur-
al heritage was being systematically damaged and destroyed, sometimes de-
liberately, but often as a result of the armed clashes between the different 
parties. The breakdown in law and order as a consequence of the war was 
also giving rise to a different type of threat to cultural property: namely, an 
escalation in the level of illegal excavations and lootings of archeological 
sites and museums, which were being fueled by the illicit trade in antiqui-
ties.45  
As with Syria, when armed conflict once again broke out in Iraq in Jan-
uary 2014, international attention was first and foremost directed at the 
humanitarian disaster that was swiftly unfolding across the country. Alt-
hough ISIS had been conducting military operations in Iraq since the au-
tumn of 2013, the growing civil unrest in Iraq presented the group with an 
opportunity to exploit the internal divisions and, by year-end, ISIS had ex-
tended its operations into Anbar governorate, adjacent to the border with 
Syria.46 Following heavy clashes with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), ISIS 
                                                                                                                      
45. As a consequence of war all major restoration and preservation projects have been 
suspended causing further damage. What is more, a considerable number of ancient sites 
are now being used by those who have been displaced by the conflict.  
46. The civil unrest had been ongoing since the end of 2012 due largely to the exclu-
sion of the Sunni community by the Shia-dominated Government in Baghdad. Although 
ISIS militants were already operating in Iraq (for example in Erbil, Kurdistan) in Septem-
ber 2013, they were only one among a handful of extremist groups conducting military 
operations. S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 55 (Nov. 13, 2013). Throughout 2013, ISIS (in one shape or 
form) had been increasing its geographical scope of operations and by the end of 2013 it 
had managed to assert control over parts of Anbar governorate, adjacent to the border 
with Syria. See also U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq Human Rights Office & U.N. Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non-
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eventually took control of Ramadi and Fallujah in January 2014, marking 
the beginning of its expansion and control of territory across Iraq and Syr-
ia. The very fact that ISIS has been able to consolidate control over vast 
swathes of territory extending from Syria into Iraq has added a new dimen-
sion to the threat to cultural property in both countries. This is because in 
the territories over which they have control, the militants have been able to 
wage a campaign to deliberately destroy the cultural heritage located therein 
and concurrently to expedite the unlawful excavation of archeological sites, 
which, according to some accounts, has provided them with a lucrative 
source of income.   
 
A. Syria 
 
The armed conflict in Syria, which is now into its fifth year, has resulted in 
extensive damage to and destruction of Syria’s cultural heritage, including 
damage to all six World Heritage Sites and to eleven of the sites on the 
Tentative List.47 In June 2013, the World Heritage Committee took the ex-
                                                                                                                      
International Armed Conflict in Iraq: June 5–July 5 2014 (2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Doc 
uments/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC%20Report_FINAL_18July2014A.pdf. 
On the emergence of ISIS in Syria, see UN Human Rights Council, Oral Update of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: Statement 
by Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Chair of the International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/CRP.3 (June 23, 2015), http://www.oh 
chr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.as
px [hereinafter UNHRC Oral Update on Syria]. 
47. The six sites include: Ancient City of Damascus, Ancient City of Basra, Site of 
Palmyra, Ancient City of Aleppo, Crac des Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah el-Din and Ancient 
villages of Northern Syria. Observatory of Syrian Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, 
https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/built-heritage (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). For 
Syria’s Tentative List see Tentative List, Syrian Arab Republic, UNESCO, http://wh 
c.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/state=sy (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). The Cultural Property 
Convention, introduced a system of “special protection” whereby such protection is 
granted to property by its entry in the “International Register of Cultural Property under 
Special Protection.” The limited success of the initiative, due in large part to the criterion 
of the property having to be located an adequate distance from important military objec-
tives, prompted States to develop an alternative listing system—“Cultural Property under 
Enhanced Protection”—which was adopted pursuant to the Second Protocol, supra note 
9. This paper concerns itself primarily with cultural property that has been inscribed on 
the World Heritage List (and the Tentative List) since it is generally assumed that such 
properties warrant particular protection notwithstanding the fact that they may not auto-
matically be accorded “special” or “enhanced” protection. That said, the World Heritage 
List offers compelling guidance as to what properties merit particular protection if no 
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ceptional decision to place all six sites on the World Heritage in Danger 
list.48 
Of all six World Heritage Sites, Aleppo is the most badly damaged as 
the city has been a battleground between government forces and armed 
opposition fighters since September 2012.49 The ancient city of Aleppo, 
which dates back to the second millennium BC, earned its status as a 
World Heritage Site for its rare and authentic medieval Arab architectural 
styles enriched by the diverse cultural imprints of the successive empires—
Byzantine, Roman, Greek and Ottoman—which once ruled over the city.50 
One of the first serious losses was of the mediaeval souqs (markets), which 
were destroyed by fire amidst the fighting between the opposing parties.51 
In 2013, the prized eighth century Great Mosque located in Aleppo’s 
walled Old City was seriously damaged and its famed eleventh century 
Minaret completely destroyed by shellfire as government forces sought to 
repel rebel fighters who had taken control of the site.52 The fighting in 
Aleppo intensified during 2014 when government forces clashed with both 
opposition fighters and extremist groups, each vying for control over the 
city. Damage to religious and cultural property across the city has been sig-
nificant due to air strikes, barrel bombings, targeted explosions, fire and 
                                                                                                                      
entry has been made to the International Register. Moreover, it is assumed that those 
properties that are listed by the World Heritage Committee unambiguously fall within the 
Article 1 definition of the Cultural Property Convention, namely that they are “property of 
great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.”   
48. See UNESCO, World Heritage Committee Report, 37th Session, WCH-
13/37.COM/7B.Add, 114–18 (May 17, 2013), http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2013/whc 
13-37com-7B-Add-en.pdf. The “danger listing” is intended to mobilize all possible sup-
port for the safeguarding of the listed property. 
49. In 2015 the World Heritage Centre noted that “some experts estimate that seven-
ty percent of its core zone has been affected by this large scale destruction [comparable to] 
Berlin and Warsaw after World War II.” State of Conservation, Ancient City of Aleppo, 
UNESCO (2015), http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3183 (last visited Sept. 8, 2015). 
50. Ancient City of Aleppo, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/21 (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2015). 
51. Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, In Syria’s Largest City, Fire Ravages Ancient Market, 
NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/world/middle 
east/fire-sweeps-through-ancient-souk-of-aleppo-citys-soul.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 
52. Richard Spencer, Syria: 11th Century Minaret of Great Umayyad Mosque of Aleppo De-
stroyed, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/middleeast/syria/10016169/Syria-11th-century-minaret-of-Great-Umayyad-Mosque-of-
Aleppo-destroyed.html. 
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heavy combat.53 Both the Museum of Popular Traditions and National Mu-
seum of Aleppo were looted; and the Waquifiyya Library was set on fire 
and its entire collection burned.54 In January 2015 the Armenian Cathedral 
in Aleppo was damaged in a targeted operation by ISIS.55 In particular, the 
use of tunnel bombs, a method of warfare that has become synonymous 
with ISIS, has resulted in considerable damage and destruction to historic 
structures and religious buildings.56 In July 2015, a tunnel bomb caused the 
collapse of part of the wall of the twelfth century Citadel of Aleppo; the 
citadel, which towers above Aleppo, has been used as a military base by 
government forces since August 2012.57  
Since early 2012, there have been armed clashes between Government 
and opposition forces in and around the ruins of Palmyra. Palmyra was in-
scribed on the World Heritage List in 1980 and was also designated a na-
tional monument by the Syrian government pursuant to the domestic An-
                                                                                                                      
53. MICHAEL D. DANTI, CHEIKHMOUS ALI, TATE PAULETTE, KATHRYN FRANKLIN, 
ALLISON CUNEO, LEEANN BARNES GORDON & DAVID ELITZER, ASOR CULTURAL 
HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND 
IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 40—MAY 12, 2015 (2015), http://www.asor-syrianheritage.or 
g/syrian-heritage-initiative-weekly-report-40-may-12-2015/. 
54. See DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF ANTIQUITIES AND MUSEUMS, SYRIAN ARAB RE-
PUBLIC MINISTRY OF CULTURE, STATE PARTY REPORT: STATE OF CONSERVATION OF 
THE SYRIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES (2014), http://whc.unesco.org/document/12 
7627 [hereinafter 2014 DGAM Report]. 
55. MICHAEL D. DANTI, CHEIKHMOUS ALI & ABDALRAZZAQ MOAZ, ASOR CUL-
TURAL HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYR-
IA AND IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 24—JANUARY 20, 2015 (2015), http://www.asor-syriann 
heritage.org/syrian-heritage-initiative-weekly-report-24-january-20-2015/; UN Rights Office 
Condemns Destruction of Syrian Holy Sites as ISIL Terror Continues, UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 3, 
2014), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48995#.VdWJvMuFP IV. 
56. MICHAEL D. DANTI & CHEIKHMOUS ALI, ASOR CULTURAL HERITAGE INITIA-
TIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ, WEEKLY 
REPORT 19—DECEMBER 15, 2014 (2014), http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/shi-weekly-
report-19-december-15-2014/; MICHAEL D. DANTI & CHEIKHMOUS ALI, ASOR CUL-
TURAL HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYR-
IA AND IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORTS 21–22—JANUARY 5, 2015 (2015), http://www.asor-
syrianheritage.org/weekly-report-21-22-january-5-2014/. 
57. Jonathan Steele, Syria’s War Scarred Citadel of Aleppo: A History of Cities in 50 Build-
ings, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/mar/24/ 
syria-war-citadel-aleppo-history-cities-buildings; Blast Damages Citadel Wall in Syria’s Unesco-
listed Aleppo, THE TELEGRAPH (July 12, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ world-
news/middleeast/syria/11735132/Blast-damages-citadel-wall-in-Syrias-Unesco-listed-Al 
eppo.html. 
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tiquities Law.58 The site, described as “an oasis in the Syrian desert,” con-
tains the monumental ruins of a great city dating back to the first century; it 
was one the most important cultural centers of the ancient world and its 
architecture fuses Graeco-Roman techniques with local traditions and Per-
sian influences.59 In February 2012, military units of the Syrian army were 
deployed to Palmyra to establish a base within the old city.60 Significant 
changes in the structure of the archaeological site and its surroundings were 
carried out (including, for example, digging trenches and building roads 
and levees) to enable the army to secure greater strategic control over the 
area and to allow for heavy arms (tanks, rocket launchers and armored ve-
hicles and other military equipment) to be deployed on the site.61 Armed 
clashes between government forces and opposition fighters during 2013 
and 2014 resulted in some damage to the ruins62 but it was the illegal exca-
vations in and around Palmyra during this period that were equally, if not 
more, damaging.63 In mid-May 2015, Palmyra became the setting of a major 
clash between government forces and ISIS militants. It is difficult to know 
                                                                                                                      
58. Site of Palmyra, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23 (last visited Sept. 18, 
2015) [hereinafter Site of Palmyra]. 
59. Id. 
60. Palmyra is located 134 miles from Damascus and surrounded by gas and oil fields, 
which supply the government’s western strongholds with much of their electricity. There 
is also a large airbase nearby. 
61. UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Rep. on the State of Conservation of the 
Properties Inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger, WHC-
14/38.COM/7A.Add, at 14 (2014), http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2014/whc14-38com-
7A-Add-en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 World Heritage Committee Report]. 
62. Anne Barnard, Syrian War Takes Heavy Toll at a Crossroad of Cultures, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/world/middleeast/syrian-
war-takes-heavy-toll-at-a-crossroad-of-cultures.html?_r=0. Government troops recaptured 
the site in September 2013 after losing control of it to opposition fighters in February.  
63. According to the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums, between 2012 
and May 2015, 125 archaeological items from Palmyra were confiscated by authorities in 
Syria, Italy and Lebanon. As experts have observed, “these figures provide some indica-
tion of the large quantity of archaeological objects that have been looted from Palmyra, 
many stolen from tombs and sectors that have not yet been excavated by archaeologists. 
The total number of archaeological items looted from Palmyra, however, remains un-
known.” Cheikhmous Ali, Palmyra: Heritage Adrift, THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF SYRIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 50 (2015), http://apsa2011.com/apsanew/palmyra-
heritage-adrift/. See also MICHAEL D. DANTI, SCOTT BRANTING, CHEIKHMOUS ALI, TATE 
PAULETTE, ALLISON CUNEO, CATHRYN FRANKLIN & DAVID ELITZER, ASOR CULTURAL 
HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND 
IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 34—MARCH 30, 2014, at 43 (2014), http://www.asor-syrian herit-
age.org/syrian-heritage-initiative-weekly-report-34-march-30-2015/. 
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how much damage was inflicted on the ancient ruins during the five days 
of fierce fighting.64 Prior to retreating, the Syrian authorities mounted an 
operation to transfer all movable cultural objects and artifacts to Damas-
cus. In mid-June it was reported that ISIS had positioned explosives inside 
the temples and monuments. In late June local communities verified that 
ISIS militants had destroyed the first century BC lion-shaped Al-Lat statue 
at the entrance to the Museum of Palmyra.65 In early July, ISIS released im-
ages of their supporters in the act of destroying a number of funerary busts 
with sledgehammers.66 On August 25, ISIS released further images of the 
destruction of the Temple of Baalshamin, which was one of the more sig-
nificant and best preserved buildings in Palmyra.67 On September 1, the 
UN released satellite images confirming the complete destruction of the 
Temple of Bel, which was considered by many to be the most important 
structure within Palmyra.68 
The Crac des Chevaliers, also a World Heritage Site, has been the scene 
of repeated fighting between government forces and opposition groups 
since June 2012. The fortress was built by the Hospitaller Order of Saint 
John of Jerusalem in the eleventh century and is one of the best preserved 
Crusader-era castles in the world. It commands a view of the surrounding 
region and overlooks the only corridor from Syria’s interior to the coast, as 
well as the entrance to Lebanon’s Bekaa valley. Early in the conflict, parts 
of the edifice were damaged by shelling in an attack by the army on opposi-
                                                                                                                      
64. ISIS took control of Palmyra on May 20, 2015. 
65. Palmyra: ISIS Members Destroyed Famous Lion-Shaped Al-Lat Statue, DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL OF ANTIQUITIES & MUSEUMS (June 30, 2015), http://www.dgam.gov.sy/in 
dex.php?d=314&id=1731. See also Site of Palmyra (inscribed in 1980), UNESCO OBSERVA-
TORY OF SYRIAN CULTURAL HERITAGE, https://en.unesco.org/syrian-observatory/news 
/site-palmyra-inscribed-1980 [hereinafter Site of Palmyra (inscribed in 1980)] (last visited Sept. 
18, 2015); ISIS Militants Destroy 2,000 Year Old Statue of Lion at Palmyra, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 2, 2015), http://www.the guardian.com/ world/2015/jul/02/isis-militants-destroy-
palmyra-stone-lion-al-lat. 
66. Site of Palmyra (inscribed in 1980), supra note 65.  
67. Islamic State Photos Show Palmyra Temple Destruction, BBC (Aug. 25, 2015), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34051870; Director-General Irina Bokova Firmly 
Condemns the Destruction of Palmyra’s Ancient Temple of Baalshamin, Syria, UNESCO, 
http://en.unesco.org/news/director-general-irina-bokova-firmly-condemns-destruction-
palmyra-s-ancient-temple-baalshamin (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
68. Palmyra’s Temple of Bel Destroyed, Says UN, BBC (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34111092. 
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tion fighters who had taken refuge there.69 In March 2014 government 
forces reasserted control over the fortress after heavy aerial bombing oper-
ations.70 The extent of the damage caused as a result of this latest round of 
fighting is difficult to assess.  
The ancient town of Bosra, another of Syria’s World Heritage sites, has 
long been a stronghold for government forces. The area is a major archeo-
logical site containing ruins from the Roman, Byzantine and Islamic eras. 
The city houses a second century Roman amphitheater, the Nymph Tem-
ple, the Saint-Serge cathedral, the Al Omari Mosque, one of the oldest sur-
viving mosques in Islamic history, the al-Fatemi mosque and the mosque 
of Mabrak el Naqa.71 In 2014, armed clashes between government and op-
position forces resulted in damage to all three mosques, the temple and the 
cathedral.72 In March 2015, government forces retreated from Bosra fol-
lowing sustained and heavy fighting with opposition forces.73 Considerable 
damage has been documented at Bosra caused by aerial bombardments, 
shellfire and gunfire.74   
Although it has been the damage to Syria’s World Heritage Sites that 
has captured global attention, religious and cultural property across the 
country has suffered a similar fate.75 In particular, citadels and mediaeval 
castles that dot the country and which rise high above surrounding towns 
                                                                                                                      
69. Syria Crusader Castle Damaged by Air Raid, AL JAZEERA (July 13, 2013), http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201371310630457364.html. 
70. Syria Crusader Castle Krak des Chevaliers has War Scars, BBC (Mar. 22, 2014), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26696113; Diana Darke, How Syria’s Ancient 
Treasures are being Smashed, BBC (July 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-
28191181. 
71. Mabrak al-Naqa Mosque, DISCOVER ISLAMIC ART, http://www.discoverislamicar 
t.org/database_item.php?id=monument;ISL;sy;Mon01;37;en (description of the mosque) 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
72. 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54. 
73. Statement by the Director-General on Bosra (Syria), UNESCO (Mar. 25, 2015), http:// 
www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/statement_by_director_gen 
eral_on_bosra_syria/#.VboWFG_bLIU. 
74. Lizzie Porter, Syrian World Heritage Site Used as Battlefield, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 
14, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middleeast/syria/11529043/S 
yrian-World-Heritage-Site-used-as-battlefield.html; LA MISSION ARCHÉOLOGIQUE FRAN-
ÇAISE EN SYRIE DU SUD (MAFSS), DAMAGE ASSESSMENT IN BOSRA (2015), http://shir 
in-international.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bosra_DamageAssessment_June2015. 
pdf. 
75. Looting of Warehouses and Museums in Syria, UNESCO (2013), http://www.un es-
co.org/new/en/safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage/situation-in-syria/movable-heritage/ 
museums/. 
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and cities have been the battleground for opposing forces fighting for con-
trol. For example, over the last four years, Homs Citadel and the medieval 
al-Madiq citadel in Hama Province have changed hands on numerous occa-
sions and, in that process, both have been damaged by shellfire.76 As ISIS 
and other extremist groups expanded their territorial holdings in northern 
Syria from mid-2014 onwards, they set about deliberately destroying 
shrines, tombs, churches, mosques and other monuments including, for 
example, two eighth century Assyrian stone lions in Raqqa.77 
Aside from damage caused as a direct consequence of war, the conflict 
has given rise to an increase in illegal excavations and lootings made possi-
ble by the complete breakdown in law and order.78 As the UN Secretary-
General noted in early 2014, “archaeological sites are being systematically 
looted and the illicit trafficking of cultural objects has reached unprece-
dented levels.”79 Illegal excavations were not uncommon during the early 
years of the conflict, but by 2013 they had become large scale operations 
with the use of hundreds of diggers and heavy machinery, particularly in 
territory under ISIS control.80 As noted above, in Palmyra extensive illegal 
                                                                                                                      
76. Abigail Hauslohner & Ahmed Ramadan, Ancient Syrian Castles Serve Again as 
Fighting Positions, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.co 
m/world/middle_east/ancient-syrian-castles-serve-again-as-fighting-positions/2013/05/ 
04/5d2bb176-b3f8-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html.   
77. Photos: Destroying Two Archaeological Statues at al-Rasheed Park in Raqqa, DIREC-
TORATE-GENERAL OF ANTIQUITIES AND MUSEUMS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://dgam.go 
v.sy/?d=314&id=1259; MICHAEL D. DANTI, ASOR CULTURAL HERITAGE INITIATIVES: 
PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 
1—AUGUST 11, 2014 (2014), http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/wp-content/uploads/20 
15/03/ASOR_CHI_Weekly_Report_01r.pdf. In February 2015 ISIS destroyed a number 
of Assyrian churches (one of which cultural heritage site) in villages in Hasakah and Sufi 
shrines in Dayr Az-Zawr; UNHRC Oral Update on Syria, supra note 46, ¶ 47.  
78. Systematic Excavations of Archaeological Sites, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/ne 
w/en/safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage/situation-in-syria/movable-heritage/archaeolo 
gical-sites/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015); UNESCO, Heritage, supra note 4.   
79. Statement by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, UNESCO Director-General Irina Boko-
va and UN and League of Arab States Joint Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi: The 
Destruction of Syria’s Cultural Heritage Must Stop, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2167#.V
eH-AvlViko [hereinafter Joint Statement by UN, UNESCO & League of Arab States]. 
80. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Satellite-based 
Damage Assessment to Cultural Heritage Sites in Syria (2014), http://unosat.web.ce 
rn.ch/un osat/unitar/downloads/chs/FINAL_Syria_WHS.pdf.  
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excavations have been documented in the Valley of the Tombs81 and Camp 
Diocletian,82 as well as looting of several stone sculptures from unexcavat-
ed tombs.83 The ancient villages of Northern Syria, another of Syria’s 
World Heritage Sites, have also been damaged due to illegal excavations in 
several locations within the site, with pits “spread all over the place.”84 Ac-
cording to Syria’s Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums 
(DGAM), the pattern of the excavations suggests that the digs were being 
carried out with a degree of expert knowledge.85 Four sites on Syria’s Ten-
tative World Heritage List have been particularly hard hit: Mari, Dura Eu-
ropos, Apamea and Ebla. 
Mari (Tell Hariri) is an ancient Mesopotamian city located close to the 
border with Iraq and dates back to 2900 BC. It is a rich archeological site 
exemplified by the discovery of an archive containing fifty thousand clay 
tablets, which “provided a window into the first great urban civilization.”86 
Conservation efforts were suspended with the outbreak of the war. The 
looting at the site has worsened over time and, by early 2014, illegal excava-
tions were reportedly being carried out by “an armed gang.”87 In June 2014, 
Mari and the surrounding territory fell under ISIS control. Satellite imagery 
                                                                                                                      
81. The Valley of the Tombs contains large scale funerary monuments displaying dis-
tinctive decoration and constructive methods. Site of Palmyra, supra note 59. 
82. Camp Diocletian was a Roman military complex built in the ancient city of Palmy-
ra in the late third century. 
83. 2014 World Heritage Committee Report, supra note 61, at 14. 
84. 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, annex at 16 (2013 DGAM Report). The forty 
ancient villages situated in eight archeological parks date back to the late Antiquity and 
Byzantine periods preserving important architectural remains. Ancient Village of Northern 
Syria, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1348 (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
85. 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, at 17. In Banasra, deep excavation pits have 
caused damage to structures such as the southern church, triggering the collapse of stone 
columns and the destruction of a large sarcophagus. Id. at 16. 
86. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE (AAAS), AN-
CIENT HISTORY, MODERN DESTRUCTION: ASSESSING THE STATUS OF SYRIA’S TENTA-
TIVE WORLD HERITAGE SITES USING HIGH RESOLUTION SATELLITE IMAGERY, pt. 1, at 
19 (2014), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/content_files/AAAS-Syrian TWHS-
122014.pdf [hereinafter AAAS Report]. 
87. Cockburn, supra note 3. See also UNESCO, State of Conservation, Crac des Cheva-
liers and Qal’at Salah El-Din (Syrian Arab Republic) (2015), http://whc.unesco.org/e 
n/soc/3194 (last visited Sept. 22, 2015); 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, at 16. 
 
 
 
Protecting Cultural Property in NIACs Vol. 91 
664 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the site evidences a significant increase in the number of excavations 
between March–November 2014.88  
Dura Europos is a 140 acre archeological site located in Deir Ez-Zor 
Governorate. The site was founded by the Seleucids in the third century 
BC and contains remains that date back to the Hellenistic, Parthian and 
Roman periods.89 Looting has historically been a problem at Dura Europos 
but the problem escalated dramatically in 2013. Reports that hundreds of 
people were involved in intensive excavation operations using heavy ma-
chinery have since been substantiated by satellite imagery, which reveals 
illegal excavations on an unprecedented scale.90 At least 76 percent of the 
ancient Roman walled city has been damaged, with analysts concluding that 
“the disruption was so extensive that counting of individual looting pits 
was impractical; the pits overlap so that it is impossible to distinguish one 
unique pit from another.”91 Beyond the walled city, the density of the exca-
vations is lower but damage has nevertheless been severe. The site has 
been controlled by ISIS since 2014 following a series of clashes between 
the group and the Free Syrian Army and the Al Nusra Front. 
Apamea is an archeological site that lies between Aleppo and Homs. It 
was founded in 301 BC and was one of the most important cities of the 
Seleucid era. The 2013 DGAM annual report concluded that, insofar as 
unlawful excavations are concerned, Apamea is one of the most badly af-
fected sites in the country.92 There have been reports of armed gangs carry-
ing out systematic excavations using bulldozers and electric machines. Ex-
cavation pits—some up to twenty meters in depth—have been document-
ed throughout the site and, in particular, around the temples, churches and 
baths.93 In February 2014, UNESCO’s Assistant Director-General for Cul-
                                                                                                                      
88. AAAS Report, supra note 86, pt. 1, at 20. Looting that occurred between August 
2011 and March 2014 resulted in 165 visible pits over 965 days, whereas activity between 
March 25, 2014 and November 11, 2014 yielded approximately 1,286 pits over 232 days.  
89. Dura Europos, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1295/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2015). 
90. 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, at 16; Cockburn, supra note 3. For satellite 
imagery analysis see AAAS Report, supra note 86, pt. 1, at 6. 
91. AAAS Report, supra note 86, pt. 1, at 6. 
92. This assessment is corroborated by satellite imagery taken of the site in July 2011 
and in April 2012. Looting at Apamea Recorded via Google Earth, TRAFFICKING CUL-
TURE, http://traffickingculture.org/data/data-google-earth/looting-at-apamea-recorded-
via-goo gle-earth/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015). 
93. See, for example, UNESCO’s assessment of the impact of illegal excavation in 
Apamea. Apamea (Afamia), UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/safeguarding-
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ture described Apamea as “completely destroyed” by “thousands and thou-
sands of illegal diggings.”94  
Ebla is located in Idlib province fifty-five kilometers southwest of 
Aleppo. Within the archeological site are a number of royal palaces, tem-
ples, monuments and burial grounds; the discovery of several thousand 
cuneiform tablets dating between 2500 and 2300 BC “revolutionized 
knowledge regarding the ancient history and political economy of the re-
gion.”95 Work at Ebla was suspended with the outbreak of the conflict and, 
during the early years, it was the setting of a series of armed clashes be-
tween government and opposition fighters.96 Looting at Ebla was initially 
small scale but, over time, the scale of illegal excavations appears to have 
increased significantly.97 
Syria’s museums, particularly in the northwestern region of the country, 
have been systematically looted throughout the duration of the conflict. 
Although at the start of the conflict the majority of artifacts from the thir-
ty-four national museums were transferred to other more secure locations, 
the losses have been significant. For example, at Raqqa Museum, important 
archeological objects from the museum’s warehouse were stolen along with 
a number of ceramic objects from an exhibition hall in the historic Citadel 
of Jaabar.98 The Museum of Hama witnessed the theft of archeological arti-
facts including a guilt bronze statue dating back to the Aramean era.99 In 
the city of Marrat, the local museum was stormed by “an armed group” 
which stole thirty pieces of art.100 The Museum of Folklore in Aleppo was 
also looted with the loss of historical pieces including glassware, Baghdadi 
                                                                                                                      
syrian-cultural-heritage/situation-in-syria/built-heritage/apamea-afamia/ (last visited Sept. 
22, 2015).  
94. Syrian Protection of Cultural Artefacts “Only Piece of Good News” Amid Rubble of War 
Says UN Cultural Agency, UN NEWS CENTRE (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.un.org/apps 
/news/story.asp?NewsID=47085#.VdZKs8uFPIU. 
95. AAAS Report, supra note 86, pt. 1, at 10.   
96. C.J. Chivers, Grave Robbers and War Steal Syria’s History, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 6, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/middleeast/syrian-war-devastates-a 
ncient-sites.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1. 
97. AAAS Report, supra note 86, pt. 1, at 14. 
98. Looting of Museums and Warehouses in Syria, UNESCO (Oct. 2013), http://www.un 
esco.org/new/en/safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage/situation-in-syria/movable-herita 
ge/museums/. 
99. 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, at 5. 
100. Looting of Museums and Warehouses in Syria, supra note 98. 
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daggers and spears.101 It is feared that many of these artifacts have been, or 
will be, trafficked out of Syria to the international antiquities market.102  
As of September 2015, figures released by the Syrian Directorate-
General of Antiquities & Museums indicate that the total number of pro-
tected buildings and sites destroyed or damaged since the beginning of the 
conflict exceeds 750.103  
 
B. Iraq 
 
The armed conflict in Iraq (which has been ongoing since March 2014) has 
resulted in a considerable level of destruction to the country’s cultural her-
itage. Of the four properties inscribed on the World Heritage List, three 
sites—Ashur, Samarra and Hatra—are on the List of World Heritage in 
Danger.104 Hatra is located within the territory controlled by ISIS. At least 
three out of the eleven properties currently on the World Heritage Tenta-
tive List have also been damaged.105 All three sites are also located within 
territory controlled by ISIS. In March 2015, nearly 1,800 of the country’s 
12,000 registered archaeological sites were located in territory under ISIS 
control.106 
In June 2014 following a major clash between ISIS and ISF, the city of 
Mosul fell under ISIS control resulting in a mass exodus of half a million of 
its inhabitants.107 Although Mosul is neither on the World Heritage List nor 
                                                                                                                      
101. Id. 
102. British Museum “Guarding” Object Looted from Syria, BBC (June 5, 2015), http://ww 
w.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-33020199. 
103. For latest figures released by the Directorate-General of Antiquities & Museums 
(DGAM), Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Culture, see DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF 
ANTIQUITIES & MUSEUMS, http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?m=315 (last visited Sept. 
23, 2015). 
104. Ashur was placed on the danger list in 2003, Samarra in 2007 and Hatra in July 
2015. The fourth site is Erbil Citadel. List of World Heritage in Danger, UNESCO, 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
105. Properties on Iraq’s Tentative List include Ur, Nimrud, the ancient city of Ne-
neveh, the Fortress of Al-Ukhaidar, Wasit, Babylon, the marshlands of Mesopotamia, the 
site of Thilkifl, Wadi Al-Salam Cemetery in Najaf, Amedy city, and the historical features 
of the Tigris River in Baghdad Rusafa. Iraq, Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage List, 
UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/iq (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
106. Islamic State “Demolishes” Ancient Hatra Site in Iraq, BBC (Mar. 7, 2015), http:// 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-31779484. 
107. UNHCR, UNHCR Position on Returns to Iraq, ¶ 11 (Oct. 2014), http://www. 
refworld.org/pdfid/544e4b3c4.pdf. 
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the Tentative List, the level of destruction to the city’s religious and cultural 
property merits comment if only because it is emblematic of the type of 
deliberate destruction that is being wreaked by ISIS on cultural property 
located in the territories that it continues to control. In addition to the de-
struction of the shrine and mosque of the Prophet Younis (mentioned 
above) the militants also used explosives to destroy the fourteenth century 
shrine and mosque of the Prophet Jirjis,108 the mosque of the Prophet 
Sheeth, the tomb of Daniel and Hamou Qado Mosque.109 Mosul Museum 
was looted and the city’s Central Library ransacked resulting in the destruc-
tion of a hundred thousand books and rare manuscripts, some dating back 
to the Ottoman period.110 On February 26, 2015, ISIS released videos of its 
fighters in the act of systematically and deliberately destroying Assyrian 
sculptures at the Mosul Museum, as well as at the archeological site of Ni-
neveh.111 The ancient city of Nineveh, one of Iraq’s eleven properties on 
the Tentative List of World Heritage Sites, is located just outside Mosul on 
the bank of the River Tigris. The site dates back to the eighth century BC, 
when Nineveh was one of the three capitals of the Neo-Assyrian Empire.112 
                                                                                                                      
108. Islamic State Destroys Ancient Mosul Mosque, the Third in a Week, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/28/islamic-state-destroys-
ancient-mosul-mosque. 
109. MICHAEL D. DANTI, CHEIKHMOUS ALI, TATE PAULETTE, KATHRYN FRANKLIN, 
ALLISON CUNEO, LEEANN BARNES GORDON & DAVID ELITZER, ASOR CULTURAL 
HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND 
IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 39—MAY 5, 2015 (2015), http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/ 
wp-content/uploads /2015/05/ASOR_CHI_Weekly_Report_39r.pdf. 
110. Muna Fadhil, ISIS Destroys Thousands of Books and Manuscripts in Mosul Libraries, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/26/isis-
destroys-thousands-books-libraries; Rose Troup Buchanan & Heather Saul, ISIS Burns 
Thousands of Books and Rare Manuscripts from Mosul’s Libraries, THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 25, 
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-burns-thousands-of-
rare-books-and-manuscripts-from-mosuls-libraries-10068408.html. 
111. Gianluca Mezzofiore, Arij Limam & Sabine Schwab, ISIS Take Sledgehammers to 
Priceless Assyrian Artefacts at Mosul Museum, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Feb. 26, 
2015), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-isis-take-sledgehammers-priceless-assyrian-artefact 
s-mosul-museum-video-1489616.  
112. For further description of the Ancient City of Ninevah, see The Ancient City of 
Nineveh, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1465/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2015). 
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The famous human-headed winged bulls guarding the entrance to Nineveh 
were destroyed by ISIS with heavy machinery and power tools.113  
At around the same time that it took control of Mosul, ISIS also over-
ran the ancient site of Hatra located seventy miles southwest of Mosul. 
Hatra had earned its status as a World Heritage site in 1985, with 
UNESCO citing the fusion of Hellenistic, Roman and Eastern architecture 
as a testament to “the greatness of its civilization.”114 Although it was origi-
nally a small Assyrian settlement, by the third century it had grown to a for-
tress city and the capital of the first Arab Kingdom.115 The site provides an 
insight into the Assyro-Babylonian civilization and, at the heart of the an-
cient city, there is a holy precinct enclosing a multitude of temples to the 
Hatrene Gods.116 On April 5, 2015 ISIS released further videos of its fight-
ers deliberately destroying stone statuary and decorative architectural ele-
ments on the walls of the ruin with sledgehammers, pickaxes and rifles.117 
The extent of the damage at Hatra is difficult to assess; access to the site is 
limited as the territory continues to be controlled by ISIS.118  
On April 12, 2015 ISIS released another video depicting the complete 
destruction of the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud, located southeast of 
Mosul.119 The site, which dates back to the sixth century BC, was the capi-
                                                                                                                      
113. Carolina Miranda, ISIS has Turned the Destruction of Ancient Artefacts into Entertain-
ment, LA TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-
et-cam-isis-destroys-artifacts-20150226-column.html.  
114. For further description of Hatra, see Hatra, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org 
/en/list/277/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
115. Kishore Rao, Iraq’s Heritage, a Treasure under Threat, WORLD HERITAGE, June 
2015, at 3, http://whc.unesco.org/en/review/77/. 
116. Id. at 21.  
117. Kareem Shaheen, ISIS Video Confirms Destruction at UNESCO World Heritage Site 
in Hatra, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/ 
05/isis-video-confirms-destruction-at-unesco-world-heritage-site-on-hatra. Earlier reports 
originating from Iraq’s Tourism and Antiquities Ministry that ISIS had bulldozed and lev-
eled the city of Hatra to the ground proved unfounded. Chris Johnston, ISIS Militants De-
stroy Remains of Hatra in Northern Iraq, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/07/isis-militants-destroy-hatra-iraq.  
118. Conservation issues presented to the World Heritage Committee in 2015 by Iraq 
can be found at State of Conservation: Hatra (Iraq), UNESCO, http://whc.unesco. 
org/en/soc/3328 (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
119. ISIS Video Shows Destruction of 3,000-year-old Assyrian City of Nimrud, THE TELE-
GRAPH (Apr. 12, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/ 
11530967/Isil-video-shows-destruction-of-3000-year-old-Assyrian-city-of-Nimrud.html; 
UNESCO Director-General Condemns Destruction at Nimrud, UNESCO (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1260. 
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tal of the Assyrian empire of Ashurnasirpal II and was on Iraq’s Tentative 
List of World Heritage Sites.120 The territory remains under the control of 
ISIS. 
The city of Ashur (Assur, Qal’at Sherqat), which was inscribed on the 
World Heritage List in 2003, is located within territory controlled by 
ISIS.121 Ashur dates back to the third century BC and was once the first 
capital of the Assyrian empire; it features a number of ancient temples, the 
Old Palace and its Royal Tombs. In its 2015 report to the World Heritage 
Committee, the Government of Iraq confirmed that it had conducted air 
strikes against ISIS targets in and around the area, causing damage to the 
Old Palace and to the protective glass over the Royal Tombs.122  
Samarra Archeological City, which lies eighty miles north of Baghdad, 
continues to remain under government control. The site was inscribed as a 
World Heritage Site in 2007 and is the only fully preserved Islamic capital 
dating from the ninth century. An attack by ISIS in July 2014 resulted in 
some damage to the walls of the Al-Ma’shuq palace located within the 
site.123 In October 2014, ISIS militants who had taken temporary control of 
an area north of Samarra, deliberately destroyed the eleventh century 
Shrine of Al-Douri, located in the area.124  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
120. For further description of Nimrud, see Nimrud, UNESCO, http://whc.unes 
co.org/en/tentativelists/1463/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
121. MICHAEL D. DANTI, CHEIKHMOUS ALI, TATE PAULETTE, KATHRYN FRANKLIN, 
ALLISON CUNEO, LEEANN BARNES GORDON & DAVID ELITZER, ASOR CULTURAL 
HERITAGE INITIATIVES: PLANNING FOR SAFEGUARDING HERITAGE SITES IN SYRIA AND 
IRAQ, WEEKLY REPORT 42—JUNE 2, 2015 (2015).  
122. See the summary of conservation issues affecting Ashur presented by Iraq in its 
2015 report to the World Heritage Committee at State of Conservation, Asur (Qal’at Sherqat) 
(Iraq), UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/ en/soc/3187 (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
123. See the summary of conservation issues affecting Samarra presented by Iraq in 
its 2015 report to the World Heritage Committee at State of Conservation, Samarra Archaeolog-
ical City (Iraq), UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/3215 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2015). 
124. Islamic State Destroyed the Shia Shrine of Imam al-Daur, CONFLICT ANTIQUITIES 
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/10/30/iraq-samarra-isl 
amic-state-destruction-shia-shrine-imam-al-daur/. 
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IV. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN CONTEXT  
 
The number of parties currently involved in the armed conflicts in Iraq and 
Syria is considerable.125 As of July 2015, in addition to armed forces of both 
Iraq and Syria, the armed forces of multiple States are conducting military 
operations in one or both States. Targeted air strikes, which have been led 
by the United States under the banner of “Operation Inherent Resolve,”126 
have been conducted as part of a comprehensive strategy to “degrade and 
defeat”127 ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In addition to the United States, Canada, 
Turkey,128 Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,129 Jordan, Bahrain, 
France130 and, more recently, the Russian Federation,131 are participating in 
                                                                                                                      
125. Although it has become common practice when identifying the applicable law 
for legal experts to set out an analysis showing the existence of an armed conflict and its 
classification, in this paper we take the position that the law of armed conflict applies in 
respect of both Syria and Iraq. Moreover the following analysis is restricted exclusively to 
a consideration of the rules applicable to non-international armed conflict. In other words, 
we do not address the issue of whether an international armed conflict exists and conse-
quently do not deal with the rules applicable to IAC. 
126. In total the U.S. State Department lists sixty coalition partners (contributing in 
various capacities) as part of the Global Coalition committed to eliminating the threat 
posed by ISIS. See The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). Recent reports indicate that 
Iran would like to play a role in the coalition against ISIS. Kim Sengupta, War with ISIS: 
Iran Seeks to Join International Coalition Battling Militants as Part of Significant Shift in Foreign Poli-
cy, THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
middle-east/war-with-isis-iran-seeks-to-join-international-coalition-battling-militants-as-
part-of-significant-shift-in-its-foreign-policy-10461307.html. 
127. Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations against ISIL Terrorists, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/ 
0814_Inherent-Resolve (“The President has authorized U.S. Central Command to work 
with partner nations to conduct targeted airstrikes of Iraq and Syria as part of the compre-
hensive strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL.”). 
128. Piotr Zalewski, Turkey Launches Airstrikes against ISIS Targets in Syria, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/099f1140-4e62-11e5-8642-4535 
85f2cfcd.html#axzz3kPgHCtEv; Gul Tuysuz & Zeynep Bilginsoy, Turkey Joins Coalition 
Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria, CNN (Aug. 29, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/ 
29/europe/turkey-airstrikes/. 
129. The United Arab Emirates pulled out of the coalition in February 2015. Richard 
Spencer et al, Blow to Anti-ISIL Coalition as United Arab Emirates Stops Air Strikes, THE TEL-
EGRAPH (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11 
390166/Blow-to-anti-Isil-coalition-as-United-Arab-Emirates-stops-air-strikes.html. 
130. Angelique Chrisafis, France Launches First Airstrikes against Isis in Syria, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/27/france-
launches-first-airstrikes-isis-syria.  
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the airstrikes in Syria.132 The UK’s involvement in the military operations in 
Syria remains ambiguous.133 In Iraq, airstrikes are being carried out by the 
United States, Australia, Canada, Jordan, Denmark, France, Netherlands 
and UK.134 It is far more difficult to identify the organized armed groups 
(OAGs) that are presently conducting military operations in the territories; 
nevertheless, the most prominent include the Free Syrian Army, ISIS, Al-
Nusrah Front and the YPG/YPJ (Kurdish People’s Defense Unit). Each of 
these parties—States and OAGs—is governed by a complex regime of ob-
ligations in respect of cultural property by virtue of treaty, customary inter-
national law and domestic law. The adoption by the Security Council of 
Resolution (SCR) 2199, pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, also means 
that the protection of Syria and Iraq’s cultural property, as set forth in the 
resolution, is an obligation that binds all States and not just those involved 
in the armed conflicts.135  
 
A. Obligations on the Parties to the Conflict  
 
The obligations on the parties to the conflicts derive from both treaty and 
customary international law. The most relevant treaty, to which both Iraq 
and Syria are parties, is the 1954 Cultural Property Convention.136 Of the 
States involved in the airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, only the United Arab 
                                                                                                                      
131. Andrew Roth, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-legislature-authorizes-putin-to-us 
e-military-force-in-syria/2015/09/30/f069f752-6749-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html. 
132. Operation Inherent Resolve, supra note 127. 
133. Whilst the UK is not listed on the U.S. Department of Defense website as hav-
ing participated in airstrikes, there are reports that UK military pilots have undertaken 
airstrikes in Syria. See Syria Airstrikes Conducted by UK Military Pilots, BBC (July 17, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33562420; Defence Secretary Criticised over Syrian Airstrikes, 
COMMON SPACE (July 21, 2015), https://www.commonspace.scot/articles/1939/defence-
secretary-criticised-over-syria-airstrikes. UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated in 
the House of Commons on July 20, 2015: “There are no UK military strikes in Syria, but I 
have explained to the House that where our personnel are embedded with other forces, 
they are participating in those countries operations that are approved by their procedures 
and Parliaments.” 598 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 1245 (UK). 
134. Operation Inherent Resolve, supra note 127. 
135. S.C Res 2199, ¶ 17 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
136. Both States are also parties to the First Protocol to the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 
U.N.T.S 358 [hereinafter First Protocol]. Iraq ratified the Cultural Property Convention 
and the First Protocol in 1967; Syria ratified the 1954 Cultural Property Convention and 
the First Protocol in 1958. 
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Emirates and the UK are not parties to the Convention.137 The Convention 
extends, as a minimum, the core rules on “respect” for cultural property to 
non-international armed conflict; moreover, article 19(1) makes clear that 
those obligations apply equally to State and organized armed groups.138 The 
1999 Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention (Second Proto-
col), which is applicable in its entirety to both IAC and NIAC, introduces a 
far more comprehensive protection framework, together with a more de-
tailed and fully developed criminal sanctions regime.139 Since neither Iraq 
nor Syria has ratified the Second Protocol, the provisions contained therein 
are not, as a matter of treaty law, binding.140 Nevertheless, as discussed be-
low, there are a number of key provisions on the conduct of hostilities in 
the Second Protocol that are binding on all the parties to the conflict—
States and organized armed groups—by virtue of customary international 
law. Likewise, although neither Iraq nor Syria is a party to the 1998 Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),141 the listed offences per-
taining to the protection of cultural property in non-international armed 
conflict contained therein are widely accepted as customary in nature and 
thus are relevant to the conflicts in both States.142 Finally, both Iraq and 
Syria are parties to the 1970 UNESCO convention prohibiting and pre-
                                                                                                                      
137. Notwithstanding the fact that some States are not parties to the 1954 Cultural 
Property Convention, the key provisions pertaining to “respect” are binding on all parties 
to the conflicts by virtue of customary international law.    
138. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 19, on “Conflicts Not of an 
International Character,” provides that “each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, 
as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cul-
tural property.” These provisions not only bind all parties to a conflict as a matter of treaty 
law, but also as a matter of customary international law.  
139. Second Protocol, supra note 9. 
140. Both Syria and Iraq have been encouraged on a number of occasions to ratify 
the Protocol. See, e.g., Statement of the Chairperson on behalf of the Committee for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict (May 21, 2015), 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/Statement_FIN
AL_ENG.pdf. Insofar as the Second Protocol is concerned, despite the ambiguous text, 
the negotiating history supports the conclusion that the said instrument was drafted by 
States with the intention of binding both States and organized armed groups alike. The 
latter would be bound, it was reasoned, through the ratification of the State concerned. 
For further commentary on this point, see Henckaerts, supra note 9, at 81, 83–84.  
141. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
142. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), CUSTOMARY INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 156 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study].  
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venting the illicit trade in cultural property143 and the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention.144  
The Cultural Property Convention can be differentiated from previous 
legal instruments concerned with protecting cultural property in armed 
conflict in that it requires States to take peacetime protective measures to 
safeguard cultural property in war.145 To meet their treaty obligations, States 
are expected not only to take measures in peacetime to “safeguard” proper-
ty of “great importance to the cultural heritage of every people” situated 
within their own territory against the foreseeable effects of conflict,146 but 
also are required in armed conflict “to respect cultural property situated 
within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contract-
ing Parties.”147 The requirement to take such measures in peacetime, cou-
pled with the extension of the core obligations to NIAC, effectively en-
trenches into international law the idea that States have a “public duty” to 
protect cultural property within their own territory.148 
The Convention defers to States to determine what peacetime 
measures are necessary to meet their obligations in war.149 In retrospect, it 
                                                                                                                      
143. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S 231. 
144. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Herit-
age, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S 151 [hereinafter 1972 World Heritage Convention].  
145. For a list of previous legal instruments see supra note 5. The 1954 Convention 
invites States to report to UNESCO’s Director-General on national implementation every 
four years. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 26(2). Parties to the Sec-
ond Protocol are invited to report on to the Committee for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict on national implementation of the Protocol eve-
ry four years. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 37(2).  
146. Id. art. 3. 
147. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). 
148. The idea of States having a “public duty” to protect cultural property in its terri-
tory can be traced to the French Revolution. See Sax, supra note 34, at 1149, n.33. This 
obligation has subsequently been reaffirmed in other treaties, including the 1972 World 
Heritage Convention, supra note 144, art. 4, which states “Each State Party to this Conven-
tion recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, 
presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage 
referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its territory, belongs primarily to that State.” 
149. During the negotiations over the treaty, it was recognized that “the financial as-
pect inherent in safeguarding measures would no doubt constitute an obstacle for coun-
tries with limited resources.” TOMAN, supra note 19, at 64. For practical measures that can 
be taken to safeguard such property in armed conflict see, for example, UK MINISTRY OF 
DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.26.7 
(2004) [hereinafter BRITISH MANUAL].  
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is far too easy to criticize the Syrian authorities charged with the protection 
of cultural property for having failed to fully prepare—both on a normative 
and practical level—for war. Reports submitted to UNESCO, together 
with statements made by the head of DGAM, indicate that the authorities 
did take some preventative measures prior to the outbreak of war.150 
Throughout the conflict DGAM has, when possible, taken affirmative 
steps to safeguard movable heritage, but the lack of resources, together 
with the fact that much of Syria’s cultural heritage is immovable, has often 
made protection impracticable.151 In particular, ISIS’s control over some 
heritage sites has placed those dedicated to protection at particular risk, as 
demonstrated by the beheading of the former Director of Palmyra Antiqui-
ties in August 2015.152 Those charged with protection responsibilities in 
Iraq have also taken similar steps in respect of moveable objects. For ex-
ample, much of the collection housed originally at the Mosul Museum was 
apparently transferred to Baghdad before the city was taken over by ISIS.153 
However, as with Syria, it would appear that there is little that can be done 
to protect immovable property other than to remind the parties to the con-
                                                                                                                      
150. For steps taken by Syria, see Ammar Abdulrahman, The New Syrian Law on Antiq-
uities, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’S ARCHAE-
OLOGICAL HERITAGE 111 (Neil Brodie et al., eds., 2001). Syrian domestic law defines 
antiquities as movable and immovable property dating back at least 200 years. Antiquities 
Law, Legislative Decree N. 222, art. 1 (1963) (amended 1999), translated in http://portal. 
unesco.org/culture/fr/files/30606/11438206173Antiquities_Law.pdf/Antiquities%2BLa
w.pdf. See also 2014 DGAM Report, supra note 54, at 28, on plans to introduce further 
legislation to protect cultural property. For a criticism on lack of protective measures, see 
Cheikhmous Ali, Syrian Heritage Under Threat, 1 JOURNAL OF EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND HERITAGE STUDIES 351 (2013). 
151. See comments by DGAM in UNESCO Amman Office, Regional Training on 
Syrian Cultural Heritage: Addressing the Issue of Illicit Trafficking: Final Report and Rec-
ommendations, at 6 (Feb. 2013), http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMED 
IA/FIELD/Amman/pdf/20130322_Report_Syria_workshop_FINAL_01.pdf. 
152. Director General of Antiquities and Museums Announces the Passing of the Archeology Re-
searcher Khalid al-Asaad, Former Director of Palmyra Antiquities, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF 
ANTIQUITIES & MUSEUMS (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d= 
314&id=1773. 
153. Suadad al-Salhy, The Full Story Behind ISIL’s Takeover of Mosul Museum, AL 
JAZEERA, (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/full-story-isil-take 
over-mosul-museum-150309053022129.html. In the wake of the unrest that followed the 
Gulf War in 1992, all moveable artifacts from Mosul Museum were removed and trans-
ferred to the main storerooms of the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad. Kishore Rao, 
Iraq’s Heritage, a Treasure under Threat, WORLD HERITAGE, June 2015, at 16, http://whc. 
unesco.org/en/review/77/. 
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flict of their obligations to comply with LOAC. The failure on the part of 
States to take adequate measures in peacetime to safeguard cultural proper-
ty in war (for example, to identify protected property, to disseminate the 
information to all parties and/or to mark it with the distinctive cultural 
property emblem) does not relieve other parties to the conflict of their ob-
ligation to respect cultural property.154 As State parties to the Cultural 
Property Convention, both Syria and Iraq would have been entitled to es-
tablish a regime of “special protection,” applicable over and above the gen-
eral protection provided in the treaty; however, neither State appears to 
have done so.155  
Before examining the specific war time obligations set forth in the Cul-
tural Property Convention, it is worth recalling that the overarching cus-
tomary international law principle of distinction, which requires all parties 
to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, prohibits all 
attacks on cultural property to the extent that such property is civilian.156 In 
both IAC and NIAC, cultural property may only be attacked if it qualifies as 
a military objective.157 “Cultural property,” insofar as the customary inter-
national law obligation is concerned, constitutes “buildings dedicated to 
religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historic monu-
ments.” This primary obligation is supplemented by the equally important 
obligation on all parties to take special care to avoid damage to cultural 
property in the course of war.158 This customary international law obliga-
tion also applies in IAC and NIAC.  
Turning to the Convention, the applicability of the rules pertaining to 
“respect,” which are embodied in Article 4, is contingent on the existence 
                                                                                                                      
154. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 4(5). 
155. Even if such a regime was in place, it is unclear as to whether there is an obliga-
tion to grant enhanced protection to cultural property in NIAC. WILLIAM BOOTHBY, THE 
LAW OF TARGETING 447–49 (2012). 
156. See CIHL Study, supra note 142, rr. 7–10. 
157. Id. rr. 10, 38(B). The definition of “military objectives” is set forth in AP I, supra 
note 8, art. 52(2). The definition includes “those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 
destruction capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a defi-
nite military advantage.” This definition reflects customary international law and applies in 
international and non-international armed conflict.   
158. Id. r. 38(A). 
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of an armed conflict, whether international or non-international.159 Article 
4(1) requires States  
 
to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as 
within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from 
any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appli-
ances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it 
to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining 
from any act of hostility directed against such property.160  
 
Article 4(2) introduces a waiver to the obligations but “only in cases where 
military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.”161 Finally, Article 
4(3) requires States “to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any 
form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism 
directed against, cultural property.”162 Article 4(1)–(3) is recognized as re-
flecting norms of customary international law applicable to non-
international armed conflict.163  
                                                                                                                      
159. See 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, arts. 18–19 (on “Scope of 
Application of the Convention”). As with all similar treaty provisions, neither article de-
fines what constitutes an armed conflict. Article 19 expressly extends the scope of the 
obligations to non-international armed conflict. Article 19 stipulates “in the event of an 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a min-
imum, the provision of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural proper-
ty.” 
160. On the obligation to respect cultural property, see DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 28, ¶ 17.11.2, which notes that this obligation “includes essentially negative du-
ties, i.e., duties to refrain from acts of hostility directed against cultural property and duties 
to refrain from the use of cultural property in support of military operations where such 
use is not imperatively necessary.” 
161. One perverse effect of this is that States party to AP I and AP II, but not party 
to the 1954 Convention, are in theory held to a higher standard since neither AP I nor AP 
II allows for a waiver. 
162. Notwithstanding the fact that the provision applies to NIAC by virtue of Article 
19, the content of Article 4 was clearly drafted with IAC in mind, as demonstrated by Ar-
ticle 4(4) which requires the parties to “refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals 
against cultural property.” 
163. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995); CIHL Study, supra note 142, rr. 38–40. Although the material scope of the Hague 
Convention and Additional Protocol II differ, Article 16 of the latter prohibits attacks on 
cultural property as well as their use for military purposes.  
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The prohibition on use, as set forth in the first limb of Article 4(1), is 
generally interpreted widely since the object and purpose of the provision 
is to protect cultural property from the effects of warfare. This rule is 
founded on the reasoning that if the property is not being used for military 
purposes, there is no justifiable reason to attack it.164 As elaborated in the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s 2015 Law of War Manual, uses that would 
be likely to expose such property to damage and destruction include: “(1) 
using the cultural property for military purposes; (2) placing military 
objectives near cultural property; or (3) using the cultural property in such a 
way that an adversary would likely regard it as a military objective.”165 Thus, 
as O’Keefe points out, the phrase “any use . . . for purposes which are 
likely to expose it” includes de facto and passive use.166  
The militarization of World Heritage Sites by establishing military 
bases, positioning armed units and fighters or emplacing artillery, mortars 
and other military equipment within and around, for example, Palmyra, 
Aleppo Citadel, or Crac de Chevalier, as was done by government and 
opposition forces, would unambiguously fall foul of Article 4(1) on use.167 
                                                                                                                      
164. BRITISH MANUAL, supra note 149, ¶ 5.25.3. 
165. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, ¶ 5.18.3. 
166. O’KEEFE, supra note 27, at 124. See also 1977 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 21, 
¶¶ 2077–78, which refers to “passive” and “active” support. As emphasized in the DoD 
manual, the prohibition embodied in Article 4(1) must be distinguished from the separate 
customary international law prohibition on using cultural property “to shield military ob-
jectives from attack, or otherwise to shield, favour, or impede military operations.” DOD 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28 ¶ 5.18.3. As is further explained, 
 
in practice this means that in some close cases the location of a military objective in the 
midst of a populated town may violate Article 51(7) API if the purpose of the location is to 
shield the military unit or facility from attack. On the other hand, the same act could be 
innocent if it were militarily necessary to so situate the unit or facility. Thus the subjective 
intent of military commander is the controlling element in determining whether there has 
been a breach of para 7 . . . or a legitimate act of war. 
 
Id. ¶ 5.16.2, n.398 (emphasis in original). 
167. Statement by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: 
 
World Heritage Sites have suffered considerable and sometimes irreversible damage. Four 
of them are being used for military purposes or have been transformed into battlefields: 
Palmyra, the Crac des Chevaliers; the Saint Simeon Church in the Ancient Villages of 
Northern Syria; and Aleppo, including the Aleppo Citadel. Archaeological sites are being 
systematically looted and the illicit trafficking of cultural objects has reached unprecedent-
ed levels. 
 
Joint Statement by UN, UNESCO & League of Arab States, supra note 79. See findings of 
satellite imagery collected in 2014, which indicate that the ancient site of Ebla in Idlib 
province, which is on Syria’ Tentative List, was also militarized. AAAS Report, supra note 
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This prohibition would also apply to other religious and cultural property 
including, for example, the use of the minarets or citadels (for example, 
Homs Citadel and al-Madiq in Hama Province) and medieval ruins and 
fortifications.168 The positioning of snipers or artillery within and around 
such sites risks transforming the property into a military objective. 
Moreover, since Article 4(1) of the 1954 Cultural Property Convention also 
forbids any use likely to expose the property to damage during conflict, the 
parties would be in breach of this obligation even if the particular use does 
not result in the property coming under attack. 
However, the prohibition on use is not absolute and must be read 
subject to the waiver in Article 4(2).169 In other words, if military necessity 
imperatively requires the use of cultural property and its surroundings for 
purposes likely to expose it to attack, such use is not prohibited. Although 
there is general consensus among States that the waiver should be 
                                                                                                                      
86, pt. 1, at 10–11. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, 7th Report of the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which states,  
  
government forces placed military objectives in and around objects of great cultural signif-
icance. Satellite imagery showed military posts being constructed in the pre-Roman city of 
Palmyra (Homs). Such posts incorporate ancient structures or were built on their remains. 
The Government, in building and positioning military objectives in and around Palmyra, 
has breached its obligations to respect and protect cultural property under the Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
 
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on its Twenty-Fifth Session, ¶ 116, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/ IICISyr-
ia/Pages/Documentation.aspx. See also U.N. Human Rights Council, 5th Report of the 
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which 
states,  
 
across the Syrian Arab Republic, historic monuments are being damaged and destroyed. 
No party to the conflict is abiding by its obligation to respect cultural property and to 
avoid causing damage to it in the context of military operations. Both government forces 
and anti-government armed groups have rendered sites open to attack by placing military 
objectives in them. 
 
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on its Twenty-Third Session, ¶ 116, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/58 (July 18, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICI Syr-
ia/Pages/Documentation.aspx. 
168. See the British Manual which cautions against use of “a church tower or mosque 
minaret” as a military observation post. BRITISH MANUAL, supra note 149, ¶ 5.25.3. 
169. During the negotiations over the treaty text, there were disagreements over 
whether a waiver should be integrated into the text of the convention. For a useful back-
ground, see Toman’s discussion on “Military Necessity” in TOMAN, supra note 19, at 72–
79. 
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interpreted restrictively,170 disagreements continue to surface on its precise 
contours and application to specific situations.171 The Second Protocol 
offers some guidance in that it provides that a waiver on the basis of 
imperative military necessity may only be invoked to use cultural property 
for military action “when and for as long as no choice is possible between 
such use of the cultural property and another feasible method for obtaining 
a similar military advantage.”172 In other words, there must be no other 
feasible option available to achieve the military objective. This does not 
fully resolve the matter since disputes are bound to materialize over what 
constitutes a similar military advantage or indeed what is deemed feasible.173 
Whether or not the parties to the conflict have violated this prohibition 
would seem to turn on whether, all things considered, the decision of the 
commander to use the property (and thus potentially render it a military 
objective) was a compelling one in light of the military objectives at the 
material time and whether there were any other feasible options available to 
preclude the choice made.174   
                                                                                                                      
170. See for example, BRITISH MANUAL, supra note 149, ¶ 5.25.3, referring to “rare 
cases where it is essential to use cultural property for military purposes is a historic bridge 
which is the only available river crossing.”  
171. The lack of a definition for “military necessity” was criticized in the BOYLAN 
REPORT, supra note 34, which led to an attempt to clarify its precise scope in the 1999 
Second Protocol.  
172. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(b). 
173. A way in which to minimize these potential difficulties is for States to fully em-
brace the “enhanced protection” regime introduced in the Second Protocol, which does 
not allow for a waiver. One of the conditions for registering for enhanced protection is 
abstention from its use for military purposes. In the case of general protection, the holder 
of the property has the right to convert the property into a military objective by using it 
for military action, but under the enhanced protection regime there is no such right. To do 
otherwise would amount to a serious violation of the Second Protocol and the offender 
would be liable to criminal prosecution. 
174. But see a recent Oral Update of the Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which states, “in some instances, 
government forces have based in historic citadels such as the Aleppo citadel or the fort 
above Tadmor, rendering them military objects. It is not determined that such exposure of 
historic sites to damage or destruction was imperatively required by military necessity.” 
UNHRC Oral Update on Syria, supra note 46, ¶ 45. See also Corn, who reasons that the  
 
use of cultural property as an observation position appears consistent with the principles 
reflected in the Cultural Property Convention if such use is the only feasible means availa-
ble for the commander to achieve a valid military objective. Certainly, the protection of 
friendly forces or the local population from threats posed by dissident or hostile elements 
during a period of occupation qualify as such a purpose. In the opinion of this author, the 
key consideration in analyzing the permissibility of such use would be the legitimacy of 
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The use by a party of cultural property in violation of the prohibition 
does not mean that the opposing side is entitled to attack the property. In 
other words, the second limb of Article 4(1) of the 1954 Cultural Property 
Convention, which prohibits “acts of hostilities” continues to apply.175 
Such acts not only include attacks, but also any other acts that result in the 
damage or destruction of the protected property. All attacks targeting, for 
example, the Crac des Chevaliers, Palmyra, Aleppo, Damascus, Ashur and 
all other religious and cultural property of great importance across Syria 
and Iraq would fall foul of this prohibition. Likewise, the deliberate de-
struction of religious and cultural property by ISIS (and indeed by any oth-
er party) would unambiguously violate Article 4(1).176 Since the prohibition 
encompass acts that do not have to constitute attacks, but which neverthe-
less cause damage or destruction, illegal excavations by the parties to the 
conflict (which might include, for example, excavations at Palmyra, Mari, 
Dura Europos, Apamea and Ebla) would also appear to breach this prohi-
bition.177  
However, as with the first limb of Article 4(1), the second limb is also 
subject to the Article 4(2) waiver.178 In other words acts of hostilities, in-
cluding attacks, on cultural property are permissible if imperatively required 
by military necessity. Thus, the waiver parallels the basic customary interna-
tional law prohibition that cultural property is generally civilian property 
and as such may not be attacked unless it constitutes a military objective.179 
The determination of whether the said property constitutes a “military ob-
jective” must be interpreted in line with existing customary international 
law. Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
                                                                                                                      
the conclusion that no other feasible alternate was available to achieve the important mili-
tary objective. 
 
Geoffrey S. Corn, Snipers in the Minaret—What is the Rule? The Law of War and the Protection of 
Cultural Property: A Complex Equation, 28 THE ARMY LAWYER 37 (2005). 
175. O’KEEFE, supra note 27, at 126 (citing statement by Legal Committee during the 
drafting of the Convention).  
176. UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Herit-
age (Oct. 17, 2003), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17718&URL_DO= 
DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
177. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(a) specifically includes ar-
chaeological sites as property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people.  
178. If acts of hostilities can be interpreted to extend to illegal excavations by the par-
ties, the waiver is clearly irrelevant. 
179. It should be noted that the effect of AP II, supra note 8, art. 16, is that cultural 
property may be attacked only on account of its use. For further commentary, see 
O’Keefe, Protection, supra note 21, at 435. 
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tions sets forth the customary international law definition of military objec-
tives as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial de-
struction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”180 This definition is also applicable to 
NIAC.181 
As Henckaerts comments 
 
The definition of military objective contains two criteria which have to be 
fulfilled cumulatively before objects can be destroyed, captured or neu-
tralized. They deal with the nature, location, purpose or use of objects 
and with the military advantage to be gained by destroying, capturing or 
neutralizing them. The nature, location, purpose or use of the object has 
to be such that it makes an “effective contribution to military action.” 
The military advantage has to be “definite, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time.”182 
 
Most experts have been quick to dismiss the possibility that in 
contemporary conflicts cultural property would by its nature, location or 
purpose make an effective contribution to military action and therefore 
constitute a military objective. While it is not inconceivable that cultural 
property might by its nature, location183 or purpose make an effective 
contribution to military action, as O’Keefe notes, “it is principally through 
its use . . . that cultural property could be expected to make an effective 
contribution to military action.”184 In the case of Syria, it is the use of 
cultural property in support of military action that has most likely served as 
                                                                                                                      
180. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Con-
flict, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 593, 599–606 (1999). 
181. See Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 2(6), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93 and Second 
Protocol, supra note 9, art. 1(f).  
182. Henckaerts, New Rules, supra note 180, at 600–01.    
183. It is worth recalling that the Commentary to Additional Protocol I recognizes 
that there are objects which  
 
by virtue of their location, make an effective contribution to military action. This may be, 
for example, a bridge or other construction, or . . . a site which is of special importance 
for military operations in view of its location, either because it is a site that must be seized 
or because it is important to prevent the enemy from seizing it, or otherwise because it is 
a matter of forcing the enemy to retreat from it 
 
1977 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 636, ¶ 2021. 
184. O’Keefe, Protection, supra note 21, at 438, ¶ 8. 
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the reason to justify attacking it. The reality on the ground is that many of 
the cultural heritage sites in Syria that had an important military role in 
conflicts over the ages are now having the same strategic role in the current 
conflicts. These sites were constructed in their particular locations—on 
high ground or at important intersections on crossroads—for the very 
purpose of providing a military advantage and time has not deprived the 
properties of those qualities. The offensive and defensive value of, for 
example, Crac de Chevallier, Aleppo’s Citadel or Bosra Castle are as 
pertinent in the current conflicts as they were when first constructed, 
which is precisely why all the parties have continued to battle for control 
over them.185 While it is not permitted to destroy cultural property which 
does not make any contribution to military action nor property which has 
temporarily served as a refuge for enemy fighters but is no longer used as 
such, attacking property being used by the adversary, as in many of the 
situations described above, may have presented, depending on the 
particular circumstances ruling at the time, a “definite military advantage” 
to the attacker.186  
In the event that cultural property does lose its protective status and 
thereby becomes a military objective, an attacking party must comply with 
the principle of proportionality and the requirement to take all feasible 
precautions in attack.187 Had Syria and Iraq been parties to the Second 
Protocol, these conditions would have been binding as a matter of treaty 
law.188 Nevertheless, the obligations are binding on all parties as a matter of 
customary international law.189 The principle of proportionality requires the 
parties to refrain from attacks, which may be expected to cause incidental 
damage to cultural property which would be excessive in relation to the 
                                                                                                                      
185. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, ¶ 5.18.5.1 (stating “military ne-
cessity generally would imperatively require the seizure or destruction of cultural property 
that is being used by the adversary”). 
186. See 1977 AP COMMENTARY, supra note 21, ¶ 2079 (stating “it is not permitted to 
destroy a cultural object whose use does not make any contribution to military action, nor 
a cultural object which has temporarily served as a refuge for combatants, but is no longer 
used as such”).   
187. The obligation to take all feasible precautions in attack is set forth in AP I, supra 
note 8, art. 57. Although AP II does not contain an explicit reference to this obligation, it 
is widely accepted that the obligation does apply in NIAC as a matter of customary inter-
national law.  See in particular, CIHL Study, supra note 142, rr. 15–19. 
188. See Second Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 1(f), 6(a)(i), 6(d), 7–8. 
189. BOOTHBY, supra note 155, at 443–45; SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 9, at 349–57. 
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concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.190 If it becomes apparent 
that this principle cannot be satisfied, an attack must be cancelled or 
postponed. It may well be that the decision on the part of those States 
involved in Operation Inherent Resolve not to target ISIS at Palmyra rests 
on this principle. The parties are also required to take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to 
avoiding, and in any case minimizing, incidental damage to cultural 
property. It would follow that the use of barrel bombs by the Syrian armed 
forces, not least in the ancient city of Aleppo, may constitute a violation of 
this rule on the grounds that such weapons are inherently indiscriminate. 
In Syria a significant proportion of the damage and destruction to 
cultural property appears to be incidental in nature and caused by the 
clashes between the opposing groups. In all attacks against opposing 
forces, the parties are required to comply with the rules pertaining to the 
conduct of hostilities, one of the “cardinal principles” being that of 
distinction.191 The principle, which applies in NIAC, is the basis upon 
which the customary international law prohibition on attacks against 
civilian objects—including cultural objects—is grounded. It follows that in 
all attacks, the parties are required to do everything feasible to verify that 
the objectives to be attacked are not civilian and, more specifically, not 
protected pursuant to the 1954 Cultural Property Convention.192 In 
addition to the prohibition on attacks against civilian property, 
indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited as a matter of customary 
international law.193 As Sivakumaran notes, 
 
the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks does not suggest that there are 
“means or methods of combat whose use would involve an 
indiscriminate attack in all circumstances,” as the rule requires regard to 
be had to all the circumstances. It is the use of such means and methods 
                                                                                                                      
190. AP I, supra note 8, art. 51(5)(b); Second Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 7(c), 7(d)(ii).  
191. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78, (July 8). 
192. See, e.g., Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 7(a). 
193. Hague Regulations, supra note 5, art. 27. Two types of attacks are prohibited: (1) 
attacks that are not specifically directed against military objectives (in short, no attempt 
was made to identify a specific military objective); and (2) attacks which treat a number of 
distinct and separate military objectives co-located with civilian or civilian objects as a 
single entity. Particularly in densely populated cities like Aleppo, the parties are under an 
obligation, where it is feasible, to conduct separate attack on each such objective. If this is 
not possible, the decision-maker must determine whether the attack is proportionate.  
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rather than the means and methods themselves that tend to violate the 
prohibition.194 
 
Thus, even if barrel bombs were held not to be indiscriminate per se, it is 
their use, for example, in the Old City of Aleppo or at Ma’arrat al Numan 
Museum, that would give rise to the likelihood of a violation.195 To 
summarize, even if the target of attack is a lawful military objective and the 
strike is discriminate, to be a lawful attack, the parties must take all feasible 
precautions in attack;196 comply with the principle of proportionality;197 and 
cancel or suspend an attack if the objective is protected property or the 
damage to cultural property would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.198  
Article 4(3) of the Cultural Property Convention requires States to 
“prohibit, prevent and if necessary put a stop to any form of theft, pillage 
or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural 
property.” The undertaking set forth in Article 4(3), which extends to all 
persons whether they are members of the armed forces, organized armed 
groups, criminals gangs or local population,199 is of particular pertinence to 
the armed conflicts in both Syria and Iraq in light of the wide-scale pillag-
ing and misappropriation of archeological sites and museums as document-
ed above. Although in international armed conflict military commanders 
have an obligation to take reasonable measures to prevent or stop any form 
of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed 
against, cultural property, whether a similar obligation extends to NIAC 
remains uncertain. Nevertheless, since the duty on the State to safeguard 
cultural property is not extinguished by the existence of an armed conflict, 
                                                                                                                      
194. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 9, at 347. 
195. UNHRC Oral Update on Syria, supra note 46, ¶ 27. See The Director-General of 
UNESCO Condemns Airstrikes Damaging the Maarrat al Numan Museum in Syria, UNESCO 
MEDIA SERVICES (June 17, 2015), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single 
-view/news/the_director_general _of_unesco_condemns_airstrikes_damaging_the_ ma 
arrat_al_numaan_museum_in_syria#.Vcr9JMvbLIU; Ma’arrat al-Numan—Report on the 
Bombing of the Archaeological Museum, ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF SYRIAN AR-
CHAEOLOGY (June 17, 2015), http://apsa2011.com/apsanew/idlib-maaret-al-numan-the-
archaeological-museum-is-da maged-with-a-tnt-barrel-06152015/. 
196. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 7(b); CIHL Study, supra note 142, rr. 15–16. 
197. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 7(c); CIHL Study, supra note 142, r. 18. 
198. Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 7(c); CIHL Study, supra note 142, r. 19. 
199. O’Keefe, Protection, supra note 21, at 443, ¶ 2. For a different view, see Patty Ger-
stenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 7 
CARDOZO PUBLIC LAW POLICY AND ETHICS JOURNAL 677, 693 (2009). 
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it would logically follow that there is such an obligation on commanders in 
NIAC.200 
Notwithstanding the fact that article 4(3) fails to expressly prohibit 
theft, pillage, misappropriation, confiscation or vandalism of cultural prop-
erty, as O’Keefe reasons, “a prohibition to this effect must be implied, rea-
soning a fortiori.”201 That such acts also constitute customary international 
law prohibitions in NIAC is in no doubt.202 The “industrial” scale of the 
illegal excavations, particularly in Syria but also in Iraq, coupled with the 
widespread looting of museums and the vandalism of cultural property, not 
least by ISIS, means that this prohibition is of particular relevance in the 
current conflicts.  
The record demonstrates that the majority of the parties to the armed 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq appear to have failed to comply with their obliga-
tions to respect cultural property in violation of treaty and/or customary 
international law norms. The consequence of non-compliance is explored 
in the following subsection.  
 
B. Consequences of a Failure to Comply with Obligations 
 
Although the establishment of a mandatory regime to criminalize breaches 
of the Cultural Property Convention was one of its main aims, the treaty 
has never served as a basis for prosecutions, primarily due to the lack of 
                                                                                                                      
200. G.A. Res. 69/281, ¶ 4 (May 28, 2015) (stating “all parties to an armed conflict 
shall prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misap-
propriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property.”). See also 
MICHAEL SCHMITT, CHARLES GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE 
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY § 4.2.2, ¶ 5 
(2006) (stating “commanders who are in control of areas where cultural property (such as 
a museum) is located must take special care to protect it from pillage, not only by their 
own troops, but also by others.”). 
201. O’Keefe, Protection, supra note 21, at 443, ¶ 2. The CIHL Study commentary inac-
curately states that Article 4 prohibits such conduct. CIHL Study, supra note 142, at 134.  
202. Evidence includes: adoption of Article 15(1)(e) in the Second Protocol, supra 
note 9, which recognizes, as a war crime, theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of 
vandalism directed against cultural property in NIAC; the case law of international tribu-
nals; the criminalization in NIAC of pillage and the seizing of enemy property in the 
Rome Statute, supra note 141, arts. 8(2)(e)(v), 8(2)(e)(xii); and the widespread condemna-
tion of such acts by States and the UN (e.g., G.A. Res. 69/281 (May 28, 2015)). See also 
O’Keefe, Protection, supra note 21, at 443, ¶ 1 (on the customary international law status of 
the prohibitions to NIAC).  
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clearly delineated criminal offences.203 This shortcoming was addressed 
with the adoption of the Second Protocol, which sets forth a list of specific 
offences.204 Since neither Syria nor Iraq is a party to the Protocol, only 
                                                                                                                      
203. However, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) does 
have jurisdiction, pursuant to the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), amended by NS/RKM/1004/006, art. 7 (Oct. 
27, 2004), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_am 
ended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (stating that it may “bring to trial all suspects most respon-
sible for the destruction of cultural property during armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 
Cultural Property Convention . . . which were committed during the period from 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979”). The 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 28, 
requires States to adopt domestic legislation to “prosecute and impose penal or discipli-
nary sanctions on those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or who order to be 
committed a breach of the . . . Convention.” Although it has been questioned (on a nar-
row reading of Article 19) whether the said article applies to NIAC, the failure to observe 
the obligations set forth in Article 4 on “respect” necessarily constitutes a breach of the 
Convention. Thus, a more satisfactory reading is that the provision does apply. For further 
commentary, see Roger O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property under International Criminal 
Law, 11 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339, 360 (2010) [hereinafter 
O’Keefe, International Criminal Law]. One of the main drawbacks of the Convention was 
the lack of clearly delineated criminal offences. This weakness was addressed with the 
adoption of the Second Protocol but, since neither Syria nor Iraq are parties to the Proto-
col, the legal consequences of violations of the Protocol are not addressed in this paper 
(for a detailed analysis on the legal consequences of violating the Protocol, see id. at 370– 
79).  
204. 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 7, art. 28 merely requires States: 
“to take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to 
prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of whatever 
nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Convention.” 
In contrast, the Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 15(1), establishes a far more detailed 
framework including identifying five categories of serious violations:  
 
(a) making cultural property under enhanced protection the object of attack;  
(b) using cultural property under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in 
support of military action;  
(c) extensive destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected under the Hague 
Convention and the Second Protocol;  
(d) making cultural property protected under the Hague Convention and the Second Pro-
tocol when it is the object of attack;   
(e) theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against, cultural 
property protected under the Convention.  
 
The first two offenses relate to cultural property under enhanced protection and the last 
three concern property under enhanced protection and general protection. The Second 
Protocol also establishes through Article 21 the two following categories of violations 
which plug existing loopholes:  
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those war crimes recognized under customary international law as applica-
ble to NIAC can be considered.205 What is immediately apparent is that, 
notwithstanding the prohibition on the use of cultural property, a violation 
of the prohibition does not incur individual criminal responsibility in cus-
tomary international law.206 That said, there is now a well-settled body of 
international criminal law whereby individuals can be held accountable for 
the unlawful destruction, damage and appropriation of cultural property 
due in large measure to the establishment of international criminal tribu-
nals.  
Two comments are merited. First, it should be noted that this body of 
law (because it is customary in origin rather than treaty-based) has evolved 
on the basis of what constitutes cultural property as set forth in the 1907 
Hague Regulations rather than as defined under the 1954 Convention. 
Consequently, protection is not limited to objects that are “of great im-
portance to the cultural heritage of every people” but afforded more broad-
ly to “institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science”207 or “build-
ings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes 
[and] historic monuments.”208 Second, to constitute a war crime, the de-
struction of cultural property must have some “nexus” to the armed con-
flict. In other words, the existence of the conflict must, at a minimum, play 
“a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit [the crime], his de-
cision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose 
for which it was committed.”209 Since the international criminal law stand-
                                                                                                                      
(a) Any use of cultural property in violation of the Convention or this Protocol and any il-
licit export; and  
(b) other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property from occupied territory in 
violation of the Convention or the Second Protocol.  
 
Second Protocol, supra note 9, art. 21. 
205. We will not explore the possibility of crimes against humanity.  
206. Attacks on cultural property which has been accorded “enhanced protection” 
pursuant to the Second Protocol would, by contrast, amount to a serious violation of the 
Protocol and incur criminal responsibility.  
207. Per the definition set forth in Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia art. 3(d), S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-
General Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808. 
208. Per definition set forth in the Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 8(2)(e)(iv).  
209. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). Importantly, 
the Chamber further elaborated,  
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ard is not always coterminous with the LOAC standard, the criminalization 
of an act may not necessarily fully capture the scope of the underlying pro-
hibition.  
The war crime of unlawful attacks against cultural property is a well-
established offence under customary international law and applicable to 
both IAC and NIAC.210 For example, in January 2013, the ICC Prosecutor 
opened an investigation into war crimes in Mali, including crimes inten-
tionally directing attacks against protected objects.211 On 26 September 
2015, on the back of an arrest warrant issued by the ICC, Niger transferred 
Ahmad Al Faqu Al Mahdi to the Court to face charges for intentionally 
directing attacks against nine mausoleums and the Sidi Yahia mosque in 
Timbuktu.212 Whether or not individuals can be held accountable for the 
catalogue of attacks against cultural property in the conflicts in Syria and 
Iraq is likely to turn on whether the cultural property constituted a military 
objective at the material time, since criminal responsibility attaches to in-
tentionally directing attacks against the said property provided it is not a 
                                                                                                                      
what ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war 
crime is shaped by or dependent upon the environment—the armed conflict—in which it 
is committed. . . . [I]f it can be established . . . . that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of 
or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts 
were closely related to the armed conflict. 
 
Id. 
210. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, Interlocutory Appeal 
of Trial Chamber Decision, ¶¶ 44–48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 
2005); CIHL Study, supra note 142, r. 156. The term “attack” is defined as “acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence.” AP I, supra note 8, art. 49.  
211. ICC Prosecutor Opens Investigation into War Crimes in Mali, ICC (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/news 
%20and%20highlights/Pages/pr869.aspx. Tribunals have treated unlawful attacks directed 
at cultural property as a lex specialis offence. For example, the ICTY has stated, “the crime 
of destruction or wilful damage of cultural property under Article 3(d) of the Statute is lex 
specialis with respect to the offence of unlawful attacks on civilian objects.” Prosecutor v. 
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 277 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Jul. 17, 2008). However, because there is essentially no difference 
between the elements in respect of such attacks and attacks against civilian objects more 
generally, the idea that cultural property is specially protected is largely absent. See Micaela 
Fuilli, The Criminalization of Offence against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest 
for Consistency, 22 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 203–17 (2011).  
212. Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Warrant of 
Arrest, Public Redacted Version (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/d 
oc2068383.pdf. See also Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-
01/15, Case Information Sheet, (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/pu 
blications/AlMahdiEng.pdf. 
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military objective.213 As in all armed conflict, there are easy cases but very 
many that are less so, as implicitly acknowledged in the text of the 2015 
General Assembly resolution on “Saving the cultural heritage of Iraq,” 
which affirms that “attacks intentionally directed against building dedicated 
to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, or historic mon-
uments, may amount to war crimes.”214 The only clear cut incidences of in-
tentional attacks directed at protected property, which were unequivocally 
not military objectives, are those involving the deliberate destruction of 
property by ISIS militants. 
In contrast to the war crime of unlawful attacks, it remains unclear as 
to whether intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that it will 
cause incidental damage to civilian objects, including cultural property, 
which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated (in other words, incidental damage to cultural property) does 
give rise to individual criminal responsibility in NIAC. No decisions by in-
ternational tribunals are available to shed any light on the matter.215 Exces-
sive incidental damage in IAC is expressly criminalized in the Rome Statute 
but no mirror offense is listed for NIAC, despite the fact that such conduct 
is prohibited in NIAC.216  
Individual criminal responsibility for unlawful acts of hostility—other 
than attacks—against cultural property is recognized to constitute a war 
crime in IAC and NIAC.217 As O’Keefe notes, such acts are treated in the 
Rome Statute “under the general rubric of the customary war crime of de-
stroying (which is taken to encompass damaging) the enemy’s 
[/adversary’s] property, unless such destruction (or damage) is imperatively 
                                                                                                                      
213. Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim, Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-
01-42-AR72, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 
17, 2008). It is for the prosecution to establish that the destruction was not justified by 
military necessity. Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 8(2)(e)(iv) sets forth the customary 
international law offence of unlawful attacks in NIAC: “intentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, his-
toric monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provid-
ed they are not military objectives.”  
214. G.A. Res. 281, ¶ 5 (May 28, 2015) (emphasis added). 
215. See MICT/ICTR/ICTY Case Law Database, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, http://www.unmict.org/en/cases/ictr-
icty-case-law-database (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
216. Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
217. Prosecutor v. Katanga et al, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Con-
firmation of the Charges, ¶ 324 (Sept. 30, 2008).  
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demanded by the necessities of war.”218 For example, the Security Council 
reaffirmed that the “destruction of cultural and religious sites” by “armed 
rebels, terrorist and other extremist groups” may amount to crimes under 
the Rome Statute in Security Council Resolution 2085 when strongly con-
demning such acts in Mali.219 
It follows that the systematic and deliberate destruction of cultural 
property by ISIS militants as part of the group’s campaign against “idola-
try” would constitute war crimes as suggested by UNESCO’s Director-
General not least because the potentially contentious issue of military ob-
jectives simply does not arise in those cases.220 In much of the literature, 
the destruction by ISIS has been described as yet another display of the 
mindless “barbarity” that has come to symbolize the group221 and as acts of 
“cultural nihilism” or “religious iconoclasm”222 reminiscent of the Taliban’s 
demolition of the Buddhas of Bamiyan.223 But although ISIS’s conduct is 
evocative of the latter, the two situations give rise to different legal out-
comes on the grounds that, in the case of the Taliban, the requisite nexus 
to the armed conflict was tenuous at best.224 In the case of ISIS, the armed 
                                                                                                                      
218. Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 8(2)(e)(xii) is founded on the prohibition set 
forth in the 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 5, art. 23(g), and recognizes as a war crime 
in NIAC “destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict.” 
219. S.C. Res. 2085, pmbl. (Dec. 20, 2012).  
220. One of the most challenging aspects of prosecuting war crimes is that, often, the 
fact of conflict makes evidence gathering difficult if not impossible. However, given ISIS’s 
insatiable appetite for publicity and self-promotion, there are digital records, often posted 
by the militants themselves, recording their trail of destruction. 
221. Michael Wilner, Obama Condemns “Viciousness and Barbarity” of ISIS Burning, THE 
JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Obama-condemns-
viciousness-and-barbarity-of-ISIS-burning-389892. 
222. Lana Asfour & Matthew Scott, ISIL and the History of Destroying History, AL 
JAZEERA (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/isil-hist 
ory-destroying-history-150302122351267.html. 
223. Following the destruction of the Buddhas, the General Conference of UNESCO 
adopted the 2003 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cul-
tural Heritage. The Preamble makes reference to the Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 
8(2)(e)(iv), pertaining to intentional attacks rather than to Article 8(2)(e)(xii) on destruc-
tion. That said, the latter war crimes refers to the destruction of property “of an adver-
sary” which clearly did not apply in that case. 
224. For two different views see Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The De-
struction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 619–51 (2003) and O’Keefe, International Criminal Law, supra note 203, at 
342–43. 
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conflicts have certainly enabled the militants to carry out their campaign of 
destruction. Moreover a significant proportion of property that has been 
destroyed appears to have been targeted on the basis of constructed divides 
that correspond closely to the conflicts. In other words, at times, the con-
flict has collapsed into a Shia-Sunni divide, which in turn often played a 
substantial part in the decision of ISIS to specifically target religious and 
cultural property associated with groups other than the Sunni community.225 
                                                                                                                      
225. The drawback to treating the conflict as one that is based simply on a Sunni/Shia 
divide is that it not only fails to capture the complexity of the situation, but it is also coun-
ter-factual on at least two fronts. First, when expedient, ISIS has directed its violence 
against Sunni communities with little concern for religious denominations. For example, in 
August 2014, over seven hundred members of the Sunni Shaitat tribe were massacred by 
ISIS in eastern Syria and, in late 2014, members of the Albu Nimr tribe were also massa-
cred. See, respectively, Liz Sly, Syria Tribal Revolt against Islamic State Ignored, Fueling Resent-
ment, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world 
/syria-tribal-revolt-against-islamic-state-ignored-fueling-resentment/2014/10/20/25401b 
eb-8de8-49f2-8e64-c1cfbee45232_story.html; Martin Chulov, ISIS Kills Hundreds of Sunnis 
from Albu Nimr Tribe in Anbar Province, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.thegu 
ardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/mass-graves-hundreds-iraqi-sunnis-killed-isis-albu-nimr. 
Second, ISIS has justified its campaign of destruction on the basis that they oppose all 
religious forms of idolatry, past and present, as aptly demonstrated by the choice objects 
and property that have been destroyed. No exception is made for Sunni property as 
demonstrated by the destruction of the shrines of Imam Yahya al-Qassin, Nabi Danial & 
Abu al-‘Ulah. Hassan Hassan, Religious Teaching that Drives ISIS to Threaten the Ancient Ruins 
of Palmyra, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ 
may/24/palmyra-syria-isis-destruction-of-treasures-feared. This is not to deny that the 
ability of ISIS to take root in Iraq resulted from the increasingly sectarian policies pursued 
by former Prime Minister Maliki during his eight years in power during which time the 
Sunni community became increasingly alienated. However, to describe the conflict as a 
Sunni/Shia one does injustice to both communities by treating them as homogenous, thus 
divesting them of diversity. The relationship between ISIS and the Sunni population is 
complex and dynamic with a large proportion of Iraqis in the territories under ISIS’s con-
trol regarding the militants as foreign terrorists and even those who tolerate the group 
appear to do so on the grounds that they are the better of two evils. Munqith al-Dagher, 
How Iraqi Sunnis Really Feel about the Islamic State, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/24/how-iraqi-sunni 
s-really-feel-about-the-islamic-state/. What is more, a growing number of Sunnis are 
fighting with Shia forces to oust ISIS. For a useful summary on the rise of ISIS, see Rep. 
of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, § II (Nov. 14, 2014), http://watchlist.org/ word-
press/wp-content/uploads/HRC-CRP-ISIS-14-11-2014-FINAL.pdf.  
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The war crime of pillage is also firmly established in customary interna-
tional law and is applicable to NIAC.226 Pillage is often used synonymously 
with “looting” and “plunder” and involves the illegal and deliberate acquisi-
tion of public or private property;227 it extends to “both widespread and 
systematised acts of dispossession and acquisition of property in violation 
of the rights of the owners and isolated acts of theft or plunder by individ-
uals for their private gain.”228 Although both treaty and customary interna-
tional law recognize exceptions to the prohibition in IAC, no such excep-
tion exists in NIAC. In principle, all persons involved in the lootings of 
archeological sites and of museums in Syria and Iraq can be held individu-
ally liable and charged with the war crime of pillage. However, despite the 
fact that the theft of objects from archeological sites may indeed constitute 
the war crime of pillage, the illegal excavations of the sites represent far 
more than just the theft of ancient artifacts. This is because archeology to-
day is not about collecting objects but rather about collecting contextual data. It is 
because the illegal excavations are destroying that information that the 
harm done exceeds pillage and more closely represents the destruction of 
heritage.229  
Given the extent of the illegal excavations, prosecutions appear war-
ranted. But since a nexus to the conflict must first be established, problems 
may surface in respect of those criminals who were already involved in ille-
gal excavations prior to the outbreak of the conflicts. What must also be 
taken into account is that there is significant evidence to indicate that a 
large number of the illegal excavators are “subsistence looters” or those 
who have turned to looting in order to survive. Prosecutions would appear 
                                                                                                                      
226. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 141, art. 8(2)(e)(v), which recognizes the war 
crime of pillage in NIAC. 
227. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 28, ¶ 5.17.4.1. 
228. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 
49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Kor-
dic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 352 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001)).  
229. Adel Yahya, Looting and “Salvaging” the Heritage of Palestine, PRESENT PASTS (Aug. 
17, 2010), http://www.presentpasts.info/articles/10.5334/pp.26/. The “upside” to com-
modification is that the cultural property is likely to be protected from destruction for the 
sole reason that it possesses exchangeable value. However, there are two strong arguments 
against not taking measures to address the illicit trade: first, the income does provide a 
source of revenue which in one way or another contributes to greater insecurity and, sec-
ond, commodification does not address the destructive aspect of illegal excavations. For 
an insight into these issues, see Alexander Bauer, The Destruction of Heritage in Syria and Iraq 
and its Implications, 22 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 1 (2015).  
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inappropriate in very many of those cases. Last, but not least, although 
there is evidence to indicate that ISIS is indeed benefiting from illegal exca-
vations, they appear to be deriving an income through the licensing and/or 
taxing of the trade230 and, as such, the war crime of pillage is an uneasy 
“fit.” This is not surprising since international criminal law is essentially 
founded on the violation of LOAC prohibitions and LOAC does not con-
cern itself with illicit trafficking in armed conflict, except in the context of 
occupation.231  
The primary international legal instrument governing the illicit trade in 
antiquities is the 1970 UNESCO Convention, which imposes an obligation 
on States to protect cultural property and to implement domestic legisla-
tion against theft and pillage.232 Although both Syria and Iraq are States 
parties, the Convention has a number of shortcomings, the most problem-
atic being its material scope of application. Article 1 defines cultural prop-
erty as “specifically designated by each State as being of importance for 
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science”; in short, inven-
toried cultural objects stolen from a museum or similar institutions. As a 
consequence, unlawfully excavated objects appear to fall outside the scope 
of the Convention.233 Even if it was possible to interpret the material scope 
of the convention to include illegally excavated objects, as with all such 
conventions, the effectiveness of the 1970 Convention is contingent on the 
implementation of the obligations by all States. For one reason or another, 
this has not happened. The ineffectiveness of the existing legal regime, be-
cause it is founded on State consent, was implicitly recognized when, with 
the adoption of Resolution 1483 of 2003 on Iraq, the Security Council in-
cluded within the text of the resolution a provision expressly addressing the 
illicit trade in Iraq’s cultural property.234 Resolution 1483, adopted pursuant 
                                                                                                                      
230. Al Rikaz Department of ISIS Licenses Excavation Works in Exchange for Monetary Per-
centage, ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF SYRIAN ARCHAEOLOGY (2015), 
http://apsa20 11.com/apsanew/al-rikaz-department-of-isis-licenses-excavation-works-in-
exchange-for-monetary-percentage/ (last visited Sept. 23. 2015). 
231. See First Protocol, supra note 136; CIHL Study, supra note 142, r. 41 and accom-
panying text.  
232. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 19, art. 5. 
233. For a different view, see Lyndel Prott, Protection of Archaeological Objects under the 
1970 UNESCO Convention, Background Paper for the Meeting of States Parties to the 
1970 Convention (June 20–21, 2012), http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTI 
MEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/Prott_arch_objects_en.pdf. 
234. S.C Res. 1483, ¶ 7 (May 22, 2003). The Resolution requires all Member States to  
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to the Council’s Chapter VII powers, requires States to take appropriate 
steps to prohibit the illegal trade in Iraqi cultural property. Taking its cue 
from that resolution, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 2199 
in February 2015, a similar obligation was inserted into the text but in re-
spect of Syria’s cultural property.235 As a legally binding measure applicable 
to all States, the Resolution bypasses State consent to fill a gap in the nor-
mative regime, thereby, in theory, enhancing the protection of the cultural 
heritage of both States.236 Moreover, because the Resolution was adopted 
pursuant to the Council’s Chapter VII powers and only applies to property 
which originates from Iraq and Syria after a certain date, it is an exceptional 
measure that leaves undisturbed the existing international legal regime gov-
erning the illicit trade in antiquities, which continues to operate on the basis 
of State consent.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
take appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural 
property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious 
importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the National Library, and 
other locations in Iraq since the adoption of Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, in-
cluding by establishing a prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with 
respect to which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed, and 
calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Interpol, 
and other international organizations, as appropriate, to assist in the implementation of 
this paragraph.  
 
235. S.C Res 2199, ¶ 17 (Feb. 12, 2015). The Resolution reaffirms the Council’s deci-
sion in paragraph 7 of resolution 1483 (2003) and requires all Member States to 
  
take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural property and other 
items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance illegally 
removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011, including by 
prohibiting cross-border trade in such items, thereby allowing for their eventual safe re-
turn to the Iraqi and Syrian people and calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific, and Cultural Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as appro-
priate, to assist in the implementation of this paragraph. 
 
236. The Resolution was welcomed by the UNESCO Director-General. UNESCO 
Director-General Welcomes UN Security Council Resolution to Step Up Protection of Cultural Heritage 
in Syria and Iraq, UNESCO MEDIA SERVICES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.unesco.org/ 
new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_director_general_welcomes_un_secu 
rity_council_resolution_to_step_up_protection_of_cultural_heritage_in_syria_and_iraq 
#.VZPF1svbLIU (The Director-General also stated that by “extending to Syria the prohi-
bition of trade of cultural objects already in place for Iraq since 2003 [the Resolution 
would provide] enhanced protection of cultural heritage.”).   
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V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
It would be inaccurate to read SCR 2199 as having been motivated by a 
concern on the part of the Security Council for the fate of cultural heritage 
in Syria and Iraq. Clearly it was not. Statements made at the time of adop-
tion indicate that the resolution represented part of a comprehensive strat-
egy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS237 and its primary aim was to 
cut off the income streams that have enabled the group to advance its mili-
tary operations and take control over territories in Syria and Iraq.238 One 
such source of revenue from which the group is said to be benefitting hap-
pens to be the illicit trade in antiquities.239 How much income ISIS derives 
from the trade remains somewhat murky.240 But even if ISIS is not benefit-
ting significantly, the fact that all States are now required to clamp down on 
                                                                                                                      
237. U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7379th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7379 (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7379 (oral statement by 
Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative). The Resolution also ap-
plies to Al Nusrah Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities asso-
ciated with Al-Qaida.  
238. Id. 
239. Martin Chulov, How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed Isis’s $2 Billion Jihadist Network, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-
arrest-jihadists-wealth-power. 
240. U.N. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (Monitoring Team) es-
tablished pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and 
the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant: Report and Recommendations Submit-
ted pursuant to Resolution 2170 (2014), ¶ 73, U.N. Doc. S/2014/815 (Nov. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter U.N. Analytical Support Report], http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view 
_doc.asp ?symbol=S/2014/815 (“Although the looting and sale of antiquities is a known 
risk, it is very difficult to reliably estimate the amount of money that ISIL raises through 
this activity, and the Monitoring Team has not received officially confirmed information 
pointing to a particular sale that was clearly ISIL-related.”). See also UK Minister for Eu-
rope, David Lidington, in the Debate on Destruction of Historic Sites (Syria and Iraq). 
592 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 1018 (UK) (stating “Our assessment is that ISIL is 
generating the majority of its revenue from oil smuggling and extortion, rather than from 
the illicit trade in antiquities. However, it is clearly our responsibility to ensure that we use 
all possible measures to deny ISIL access to funds . . . ”). But see comment by the Direc-
tor-General of UNESCO reported in Islamic State Militants “Destroy Palmyra Statues,” BBC 
(July 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33369701. UNESCO’s 
Director-General Irena Bokova told the BBC that looting was being carried out on an 
industrial scale and that IS militants were “using the illicit trafficking, the selling of these 
objects in order to finance extremism and terrorism.” 
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the trade is a welcome step given the scale of the damage that is being ex-
acted on archeological sites across Syria and Iraq.241  
The international community’s concern over the threat posed by ISIS is 
hardly surprising. After all, ISIS’s expansion and control over large swathes 
of territories stretching across both Iraq and Syria coupled with its preten-
tions to “state”-hood has been deeply troubling for the international com-
munity of States since, by its actions and claims, the very edifice and prin-
ciples upon which the international legal order is constituted is being defied 
by the group. The pushback by States has taken a variety of forms includ-
ing and, in particular, through narratives around claims over cultural prop-
erty rights. This is demonstrated by the repetitive references to the threat 
posed by ISIS as one that is directed both at the national heritage of Iraq 
and of Syria242 as much as at the common heritage of all peoples, enabling 
States, other than Iraq and Syria, to assert a legitimate interest.243 For ex-
ample, on September 22, 2014, in a speech at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry condemned the de-
struction of cultural property by ISIS stating,  
 
our heritage is literally in peril in this moment, and we believe it is impera-
tive that we act now. We do so knowing that our leadership, the leader-
ship of the United States, can make a difference and that the fight to pro-
tect the cultural heritage of Iraq and Syria isn’t just about shared values. 
It’s about protecting a shared legacy. 
 
“How shocking and historically shameful it would be” he insisted, “if we 
did nothing while the forces of chaos rob the very cradle of our civiliza-
tion.”244 On the same day, half way round the world, a U.S.-led coalition of 
                                                                                                                      
241. U.N. Analytical Support Report, supra note 240, ¶ 72. 
242. See also Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF 
TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terrance Ranger, eds., 1992) (explaining how modern 
nations invent traditions to deny their modernity and lay claim to continuous, historical 
existences as single, unified communities). 
243. John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, Remarks at NY Metropolitan Museum of 
Art: Threats to Cultural Heritage in Iraq and Syria (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www. 
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/231992.htm. In condemning the destruction and 
damage wrought by ISIS on cultural property in Syria and Iraq, Kerry further stated, “ISIS 
forces the people of Iraq and Syria to pay for their cultural heritage in blood. We are de-
termined instead to help Iraqis and Syrians protect and preserve their heritage in peace. 
That’s our common responsibility.” 
244. Id. (“We urge all parties in Iraq and Syria and the international community to re-
spect and protect archaeological, historic, religious, and cultural sites, including museums 
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States launched the first airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria, extending 
the geographical reach of the military operations against the group.245  
Rhetoric aside, the commitment by States to the protection of cultural 
property in armed conflict nonetheless remains equivocal both in practice 
and in law. The deliberate destruction of cultural property by ISIS is shock-
ing but when we permit our attention to be entirely consumed by the theat-
rical, too often all else becomes banal. As outlined above, existing law pro-
hibits and criminalizes the type of conduct pursued by ISIS. That such law 
already exists is regrettably an indication that there is nothing novel in their 
behavior save for the fact that the perpetrators openly and pro-actively 
choose to display their criminality to a global audience. Modern technolo-
gies have likewise enabled civil society, the media, researchers and States to 
document and collate far more information than ever before in conflict 
situations, including damage to and destruction of cultural property. What 
has been documented to date indicates that a significant proportion of the 
destruction and damage to Syria’s cultural heritage over the last four years 
has come about as a consequence of the hostilities between the different 
armed groups. Much of it is likely to be justified on the basis of military 
necessity and/or to be deemed incidental in nature. Such damage is gener-
ally treated with silence by States although there are always exceptions. For 
example SCR 2199 condemns the destruction of cultural property by ISIS 
and ANF “whether such destruction is incidental or deliberate.”246 In so 
doing, the resolution draws attention to the ever present risk that the very 
rules that allow for violence normalizes what should be the abnormal.247 In 
the last two decades there have been significant advances in the legal pro-
tection of cultural property in NIAC. But the measure of our commitment 
to the protection of cultural property in conflict will continue to fall short 
until such time that we collectively consider outdated the words of General 
Eisenhower when, just prior to the Allied offensive into Italy in May 1944, 
he declared:  
 
                                                                                                                      
and archives, and reaffirm that all those who destroy important cultural property must be 
held accountable.”). 
245. The military operations against ISIS in Iraq were launched in mid-June.  
246. S.C Res. 2199, ¶ 15 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
247. As Bernbeck reminds us, “orthodoxies can become so well established that they 
sediment in collective consciousness to a level of nondiscursiveness.” Reinhard Bernbeck, 
Heritage Politics: Learning from Mullah Omar?, in CONTROLLING THE PAST, OWNING THE 
FUTURE: THE POLITICAL USES OF ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 27 (Ran Boyt-
ner, Lynn Swartz Dodd & Bradley J. Parker eds., 2010).  
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Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in 
battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our 
advance will be found historical monuments and cultural centers which 
symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the re-
sponsibility of every commander to protect and respect these symbols 
whenever possible. . . . [W]here military necessity dictates, commanders 
may order the required action even though it involves destruction to 
some honored site.248 
 
Until such time, it would seem that the most that we can strive for is a little 
less barbarity in light of the fact that cultural treasures  
 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents 
who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contem-
poraries. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same 
time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of 
barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted 
from one owner to another.249 
                                                                                                                      
248. Memorandum from General Dwight Eisenhower, 26 May 1944, reprinted in AN-
NOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 8-26, n.122. (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, U.S. 
Naval War College International Law Studies). 
249. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS, ESSAYS 
AND REFLECTIONS (Walter Benjamin, eds., 1999).  
